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I. INTRODUCTION
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (“UNHCR”)—the UN agency tasked with protecting and
assisting refugees around the world, global forced displacement
increased in 2015 with record-high numbers.1 Currently, there are
65.3 million individuals forcibly displaced worldwide—of which 12.4
million are newly displaced—as a result of persecution, conflict,
generalized violence, and human rights violations.2 The current
number of displaced persons is the equivalent of the population of the
twenty-first largest country in world—larger than the entire
population of the United Kingdom.3 This total reflects 5.8 million
more total displaced than in 2014, and the numbers are continuing to

1. U.N. H IGH C OMMISSIONER FOR R EFUGEES, G LOBAL TRENDS FORCED
D ISPLACEMENT IN 2015 2 (June 20, 2016), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
576408cd7.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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climb.4 In fact, right now twenty-four new people are being displaced
every minute.5
Of the 65.3 million displaced worldwide:
 21,300,000 are refugees who had to flee their own country;
o
16,100,000 of which fall under UNHRC’s mandate
o
5,200,000 of which are Palestinian refugees registered
under a separate mandate through the UN Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(“UNRWA”)
 40,800,000 are persons internally displaced within their own
country; and
 3,200,000 are asylum seekers.6

About fifty percent of the world’s refugees can be found in Asia and
some twenty-eight percent can be found in Africa.7 It is left up to the
developing countries of the world to play host to most refugees—with
eighty-six percent of all refugees living in developing regions.8
In general, refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced
people face a number of human rights violations, including, but not
limited to:











4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

restrictions on right to liberty of movement
restrictions on right to liberty and security of person
arbitrary arrest and/or detention
restrictions on right, once deprived of liberty, to be treated
with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person
restrictions on freedom to choose one’s residence
restrictions on right to work
restrictions on right to an adequate standard of living for
oneself and one’s family, including adequate food,
clothing, and housing, and to the continuous improvement
of living conditions
restrictions on right to access health care
restrictions on right to education
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 2.
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sexual and gender based violence
forced labor
trafficking
recruitment of child soldiers
torture and/or cruel or degrading treatment
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Thailand is a host to a significant number of refugees. In its role
as host, Thailand also provides some protection against refugee
expulsion/return and allows persons fleeing conflict or other incidents
of violence in neighboring countries to cross over the border into
Thailand and remain until conflict ceases.9 The main population of
concern in this report is Burmese refugees of mostly ethnic Kayin
(formerly Karen) and Kayah (formerly Karenni) origin who are
enduring one of the most protracted refugee situations in the world.10
Many arrived in temporary shelters on the Thai-Burma11 border as
early as 1984.12 Other populations of concern in Thailand, outside the
scope of this report, include urban refugees and asylum seekers from
more than thirty different nationalities, mainly residing in Bangkok.13
Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees nor its 1967 Protocol. Nevertheless, Thailand
is bound by the many obligations attached to the several international
human rights treaties to which it is a State party. With few exceptions,
these human rights protections to which Thailand must adhere apply
to everyone in its jurisdiction—including refugees.

9. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Thailand 2014 Human
Rights Report 29 (2014).
10. U.N. H IGH C OMMISSIONER FOR R EFUGEES, 2014-2015 GLOBAL APPEAL:
THAILAND 1 (2015), available at http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/fundraising/
528a0a330/unhcr-global-appeal-2014-2015-thailand.html. Others are of Bamar, Shan, and
Mon descent.
11. This report uses the term Thai-Burma border to refer to the border between Thailand
and Myanmar, as this is how the border is referred to by the refugees, NGOs, and officilas
whom we interviewed. [Burma was renamed Myanmar in 1989 by the military junta then in
control of the government.] This report uses the term Myanmar to refer to the government or
state of Myanmar generally, but uses the term Burma when referring to an occurrence that
specially took place prior to 1989. Quoted interviewees may refer to either Burma or Myanmar
interchangeably. Finally, this report uses the term Burmese to refer to any of the peoples of
Burma, regardless of ethnic group.
12. See U.N. H IGH C OMMISSIONER FOR R EFUGEES, 2014-2015 GLOBAL APPEAL,
supra note 10, at 1.
13. Id.
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Thailand’s domestic law does not provide for the granting of
asylum or refugee status.14 Burmese refugees living outside official
refugee camps are by law considered illegal migrants.15 If arrested,
they are subject to indefinite detention at Immigration Detention
Centers (“IDCs”) and/or deportation.16 As this report describes, the
human rights of the approximately 110,000 Burmese refugees living
in the nine refugee camps along the border with Myanmar are
routinely violated. In the past two years in these camps, greater
enforcement of restrictions on freedom of movement and the right to
work, combined with decreases in resources and services—including
access to adequate food, shelter, health care, and educational
services—have created conditions which threaten to coercively return
these refugees to Myanmar. Repatriation in this manner is not truly
voluntary, but is instead a form of constructively forced return. Due to
the conditions that currently exist in Myanmar, many of these coerced
returns would also constitute a violation of the principle of nonrefoulement, in clear contravention of Thailand’s treaty obligations
and accepted norms of customary international law.
This Report represents the culmination of a two-year
interdisciplinary project undertaken by the Leitner Center for
International Law and Justice at Fordham Law School. A delegation
from Fordham visited Thailand and Myanmar in May 2015 to conduct
research and interviews. The Fordham delegation was led by the
2014–15 Crowley Fellow in International Human Rights, Zach
Hudson. The delegation included Fordham Law School Professor
James Kainen, Leitner Center Executive Director Elisabeth Wickeri,
Leitner Center Program Assistant Elizabeth Gyori, and eight secondyear law students: Rodrigo Bacus, Krista Hahn Bloomenberg,
Thomas Callahan, Hailey Flynn, Stella Gilliland, Olivia Gonzalez,
Christina Menga, and Celidon Pitt. Members of the Fordham
delegation also traveled to Geneva in March 2016 to carry out followup research, and to conduct advocacy and present findings through
the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (“UPR”)
process for Thailand.

14. See Immigration Act, B.E. 2522 (Thai.); Nationality Act, B.E. 2535 (Thai.)
15. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, A D H OC AND I NADEQUATE 4 (2012), available at
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/thailand0912.pdf [hereinafter AD HOC AND
INADEQUATE].
16. Id.
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Prior to conducting fieldwork in Thailand and Myanmar, the
delegation participated in an intense program of study throughout the
academic year, including a seminar led by Mr. Hudson and Ms.
Wickeri that focused on the intersection of refugee protection issues
and human rights in Thailand. During the visit to Thailand and
Myanmar, the delegation conducted interviews with individuals in
refugee camps, refugee committees, non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”), lawyers, academics, donor agencies, members of the
government, and the United Nations. Members of the Crowley
delegation traveled to three different areas along the Thai-Burma
border encompassing the nine refugee camps housing Burmese
refugees, in addition to traveling to both Bangkok and Yangon.
This Report presents the findings of this research effort. Part II
describes the conditions in which Burmese refugees living in
Thailand find themselves—and the conditions in Myanmar that serve
as both the cause of their refugee status and the obstacle to their
return. Part III sets out the international human rights legal framework
governing refugee protection issues and provides an analysis of the
conditions in which Burmese refugees find themselves through the
lens of these international human rights legal frameworks. The Report
then concludes with a series of recommendations aimed at ensuring
that the human rights of Burmese refugees living in Thailand are
protected—and that violations of their rights do not lead to
constructive refoulement to a place where their lives or liberty would
be threatened.
II. STATUS OF BURMESE REFUGEES LIVING IN THAILAND
a. Overview of General Conditions for Refugees Living in Thailand
For decades, Thailand has been a “reluctant host” to large
numbers of refugees fleeing persecution in neighboring countries.17
Following the establishment of camps for Cambodian, Lao, and
Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s,18 the first camps for Burmese
refugees were established along the Thai-Burma border in 1984.19
17. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 18 n.12.
18. See Hazel Lang, The repatriation predicament of Burmese Refugees in Thailand: a
preliminary analysis 2 (Austl. Nat’l Univ., Working Paper No. 46, 2001). The last of the nonBurmese camps was closed in 2009. See id.
19. Lang, supra note 18, at 1; see also AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 15.
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While the numbers of camps and refugees have fluctuated over the
last thirty years,20 today the Thai government recognizes nine
Burmese refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border.21 There is also
a tenth camp—Kuang Jor—housing ethnic Shan from Myanmar.22
The refugees living in Kuang Jor receive humanitarian aid, but the
camp is not formally recognized by either the Thai government or
UNHCR.23
As of December 2016, UNHCR and the Thai Ministry of Interior
confirmed that there are a total of 102,607 Burmese refugees now
living in the nine camps.24 At the time this project began, there were
110,637 camp residents.25 With some fluctuation, the general trend
over the past six years has been a steady decrease in camp
populations.26 In addition to the refugees living in the camps, there are
an estimated one to three million Burmese living in Thailand outside
the camps.27
The camps along the border are the only recognized asylum
spaces for Burmese refugees in Thailand—those living outside the
camps are generally considered “illegal” and, if caught, face
deportation.28 Thai officials have openly declared the government’s
20. See Adam Saltsman, Beyond the Law: Power, Discretion, and Bureaucracy in the
Mgmt. of Asylum Space in Thailand, 27 J. REFUGEE STUD. 457, 462 (2014) (noting that in the
1980s, there were thirty open, informal, village-like Burmese refugee camps in Thailand,
which lasted until 1984 when cross-border attacks by the Burmese Army prompted the Thai
government to consolidate and regulate the camps).
21. See, e.g., BORDER CONSORTIUM, PROGRAMME REPORT JULY - DECEMBER 2014
(2014), available at http://www.theborderconsortium.org/media/57485/2014-6-Mth-Rpt-JulDec.pdf [hereinafter TBC PROGRAM REP.]. The nine camps are (from north to south): Ban Mai
Nai Soi, Mae Surin, Mae La Oon, Mae Ra Ma Luang, Mae La, Umpiem Mai, Nu Po, Ban Don
Yang, and Tham Hin. See generally U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES THAILAND,
https://www.unhcr.or.th/en (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
22. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 18 n.12.
23. Id.
24. Refugee and IDP Camp Populations: December 2016, B ORDER C ONSORTIUM
(2016), http://www.theborderconsortium.org/media/76787/2016-12-dec-map-tbc-unhcr.pdf.
25. Refugee and IDP Camp Populations: February 2015, B ORDER C ONSORTIUM
(2015),
http://www.theborderconsortium.org/media/58064/2015-02-feb-map-tbc-unhcr.pdf.
This figure is calculated by The Border Consortium (“TBC”) and includes all persons
confirmed to be living in the camps and eligible for rations, registered or not. Id. This total also
includes the approximately 513 Shan refugees living in Kuang Jor camp.
26. AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 3. From 2005-2012, the total camp
population held fairly steady at around 140,000. Id. at 5.
27. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 15. This figure includes both
refugees and economic migrants, as well as individuals who may self-identify as economic
migrants but who may fit the refugee definition as well.
28. See Saltsman, supra note 20, at 461.
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desire to close the camps and return the refugees to Myanmar for at
least the last fifteen years,29 but as of yet there have been no mass
repatriations. Nevertheless, recent ceasefires between the Burmese
army and armed rebel groups in Myanmar and recent agreements
between the governments of the two countries have sparked fears that
forced repatriations may be forthcoming.30
1. Refugee Management in Thailand
A. Government
A myriad of Thai authorities and other actors are responsible for
refugee management in and outside of the refugee camps. Thailand is
a constitutional monarchy, with the King as the head of state.31 Under
the King, refugee management is primarily undertaken at the national
level by the Ministry of Interior (“MOI”) and the Ministry of Defense
(“MOD”) through the Royal Thai Army.32 As of 2013, the MOI and
the Army affected management through five different security
forces.33 Despite the official government role in regulating various
aspects of refugee life, there is no government structure for the
provision of humanitarian aid or refugee protection.34
The MOI is the ultimate authority over the nine recognized
camps.35 As such, the Ministry executes the policies set forth by the
national government through its provincial and district authorities.36
The top provincial authority appointed by the MOI is the district
commander, or nai amphur.37 The nai amphur is in charge of the

29. See Lang, supra note 18, at 2.
30. See, e.g., Thin Lei Win, Thai military conducts refugee headcount, sparking fears of
forced repatriation, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (July 21, 2014, 9:41 AM),
http://www.trust.org/item/20140721092847-kd7i3/.
31. See Rattha Thammanun Haeng Ratcha Anachak [C ONSTITUTION ] July 22, 2014, § 2
(Thai.).
32. See Saltsman, supra note 20, at 462.
33. Id. It is unclear what changes, if any, have occurred with regards to the national legal
framework for refugee management following the May 2014 coup.
34. Id.
35. See JULIE FRECCERO & KIM THUY SEELINGER, SAFE HAVEN: SHELTERING
DISPLACED PERSONS FROM SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED-VIOLENCE-CASE STUDY:
THAILAND 30 (2013), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/51dc189d4.html.
36. Id.
37. This is may also spelled “nai ampur”. See KIRSTEN MCCONNACHIE, GOVERNING
REFUGEES: JUSTICE, ORDER, AND LEGAL PLURALISM 80 (2014); see also AD HOC AND
INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 42.

338

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:2

general administration of each district.38 The MOI also appoints a
camp commander (palad) and employs the Voluntary Defense Corps
(Or Sor) for each camp.39 The palad and Or Sor are responsible for
regulating the camps, including perimeter security, headcounts, and
camp entry and exit.40 Or Sor members are generally poorly trained
and underpaid and are recruited from local communities.41 The Or Sor
unit in Mae La camp is particularly “notorious for corrupt and abusive
practices.”42
In the context of refugee management, the Royal Thai Army is
chiefly responsible for Thai-Burma border security.43 Together with
its paramilitary proxy force, the Tahan Phran rangers, and the
paramilitary Border Patrol police, the Army undertakes management
of cross-border affairs and counter-narcotics work.44 The Army is also
involved in regulating and counting camp populations,45 and
sometimes completes initial assessments of arriving refugees as they
cross the border.46 Thai immigration police and the regular Thai
police force also play a role in refugee management,47 particularly
outside the camps. These authorities are tasked with enforcing
Thailand’s Immigration Law by identifying and arresting
undocumented foreigners through checkpoints, raids, and street
searches.48
B. Refugee Committees
Although the MOI has ultimate authority over the camps, day-today operations are overseen by refugee committees, camp
38. CLARK D. NEHER, MODERN THAI POLITICS: FROM VILLAGE TO NATION 189 (1981).
Each of Thailand’s provinces is subdivided into districts, of which the nai amphur is
commander. See also JOHN WILLIAM HENDERSON, ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR THAILAND
183 (3d ed. 1971). It has been difficult to find any up-to-date information about the nai
amphurs’ role or specific information on the nai amphurs’ activities relating to refugee
management.
39. MCCONNACHIE, supra note 37, at 30.
40. AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 42; see also id.
41. AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 42.
42. Id.
43. Id.; see also INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, THAILAND MIGRATION REPORT 2011 120
(Jerrold W. Huguet & Aphichat Chamratrithirong eds., 2011) [hereinafter IOM REPORT 2011].
44. AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 42; see also IOM REPORT 2011, supra
note 43, at 120.
45. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 25.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 42.
48. See id. at 6.
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committees, and community-based organizations.49 The refugee
committees are supra-camp bodies that coordinate with camp
committees and liaise with the Thai government, UNHCR, donors,
and NGOs.50 The Karen Refugee Committee (“KRC”) manages the
seven Karen-majority camps, and the Karenni Refugee Committee
(“KnRC”) organizes between the two predominantly Karenni
camps.51 There is also a refugee committee for Shan refugees.52 In the
past, there has been evidence that the KRC and KnRC had ties to the
armed ethnic groups fighting the Burmese army in Myanmar.53 It is
not clear how, if at all, the recent ceasefire agreements between the
armed groups and the Burmese army have affected these ties.
The refugee committees do not work directly in the camps.54
Rather, they operate through camp committees,55 which oversee daily
management and operations, camp justice systems, and refugee
security.56 Camp committees have also established subcommittees to
manage health activities, education, camp affairs, and supply
provisions.57 The committees also play a major role in controlling
distribution of rations and building materials.58 Committees are drawn
from the refugee populations through a selection process that involves
at least an initial round of voting by the camp residents.59
Food, shelter materials, services, and other aid are provided by
NGOs, many of which are represented by The Border Consortium
(“TBC”).60 The Thai government does not provide humanitarian
support for the camps, so TBC and other NGO providers are heavily

49. See IOM REPORT 2011, supra note 43, at 120.
50. Id. at 120-21; see also SUSAN BANKI & HAZEL LANG, PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE:
THE IMPACT OF RESETTLEMENT ON THE REMAINING CAMP POPULATION 21 (2007).
51. FRECCERO & SEELINGER, supra note 35, at 30-31. Across all nine recognized camps,
approximately seventy-nine percent of refugees are Karen, ten percent are Karenni, and the
remainder is a mixture of other ethnic groups.
52. IOM REPORT 2011, supra note 43, at 120.
53. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 48-49.
54. See BANKI & LANG, supra note 50, at 21.
55. See IOM REPORT 2011, supra note 43, at 120-21.
56. FRECCERO & SEELINGER, supra note 35, at 30-31.
57. See IOM REPORT 2011, supra note 43, at 121.
58. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 28 (discussing the level of power
committees hold over food distribution lists).
59. IOM REPORT 2011, supra note 43, at 121. At the time of this report, all camp
residents over age twenty were eligible to vote.
60. AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 25.
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dependent on donations from international donors in order to meet the
needs of camp residents.61
C. UNHCR
UNHCR is an international organization “dedicated to saving
lives, protecting rights and building a better future for refugees,
forcibly displaced communities and stateless people.”62 UNHCR has
had a presence on the Thai-Burma border since 1998, when it
negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding with the Thai
government63; however, Thai authorities have never allowed the
agency to have a role in the operation of the camps.64 UNHCR is not
permitted to provide assistance to the camps or to register refugees
living there,65 and it may only access the camps through the provision
of a pass granted by permission of district-level MOI officials.66
Limits to UNHCR’s role are not restricted to the camps.
UNHCR has not been permitted to conduct refugee status
determinations for Burmese refugees outside the camps since 2004,
following the government’s mandate that all Burmese refugees should
live in the camps.67 The agency may only access IDCs on a
“conditional” basis, meaning that it must submit an official request
for permission to visit, and it may not conduct status determinations
or registrations during the visit.68
For non-Burmese, non-Lao, and non-North Korean asylum
seekers, UNHCR conducts refugee status determinations and issues
“Asylum Seeker Certificates” to those it determines qualify as
refugees.69 However, these certificates provide no employment
authorization and have no legal weight if the holder is stopped by
police.70 UNHCR provides refugees (including Burmese refugees
61. See generally id.
62. About Us, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html (last visited Apr.
13, 2015).
63. Sally Thompson, Community-based Camp Management, 30 FORCED MIGRATION
REV. 26, 26 (2008). The Memorandum of Understanding gave UNHCR a mandate for
monitoring and protection of refugees on the Thai-Burma border. See id.
64. AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 19.
65. See id. at 88.
66. See id. at 19.
67. Id. at 1. UNHCR is also barred from performing refugee status determinations for
Lao Hmong or North Korean refugees in Thailand.
68. See id. at 88.
69. Id. at 87.
70. See id.
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outside the camps) with emergency phone numbers to call in case of
arrest, though refugees and asylum seekers report that their calls often
go unanswered.71
2. Treatment of Refugees in Thailand
Under national law, asylum seekers and refugees in Thailand are
treated as illegal migrants.72 Burmese refugees are legally allowed to
remain in the country as long as they stay within one of the nine
camps, which Thailand maintains as “temporary shelters” for
“displaced persons fleeing fighting” until the conditions in Myanmar
allow for return.73 This legal treatment underlies the government’s
general policy that the country is “unwilling to remain an indefinite
host” to the Burmese refugees currently residing within its borders,
and that the sooner the refugees can return home, the better.74
The treatment of refugees generally in Thailand is reflective of a
popular perception that the refugees pose national security, economic,
and cultural threats to Thai society.75 This perception is heavily
influenced by Thai political rhetoric and media reports,76 and
translates to a treatment of refugees that varies significantly between
different refugee populations based upon ethnicity, location within
Thailand, and country or province of origin. The government’s
negative attitude toward refugees carries over to Thai society, where
there tends to be an entrenched prejudice against immigrants and
refugees, particularly among Burmese populations.77 Burmese
migrants are commonly seen as criminals, carriers of disease, and as a
drain on the economy.78 These perceptions are often reinforced by
political rhetoric and media reports that frequently highlight any
crimes committed by Burmese migrants.79 In 2006, UNHCR reported
that a rise in threats, harassment, and violence against refugees in
urban centers had been fueled in part by media reports that refugees

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 7.
Lang, supra note 18, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Inge Brees, Burden or Boon: The Impact of Burmese Refugees on Thailand, 11
WHITEHEAD J. OF DIPL. & INT’L REL. 1, 37 (2010).
76. See id.
77. Saltsman, supra note 20, at 461.
78. Id.
79. See Brees, supra note 75, at 37.
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spread disease.80 Media reports that perpetuate the idea that Thailand
is being overrun by foreigners81 feed into fears that a change in
Thailand’s demographics will lead to a loss of Thai culture.82
The treatment of refugees in Thailand may differ depending on a
variety of factors. An individual who identifies as an economic
migrant, for example, is generally treated differently from an
individual who identifies as a refugee. Individuals labeled as
“refugees” are not permitted to work in Thailand,83 while individuals
labeled as “economic migrants” are not eligible for refugee protection
or resettlement.84 This is the case even though a self-identified
economic migrant may have experienced persecution (for example,
by being forced into labor by the Burmese army or held as a political
prisoner) that would qualify him or her as a de facto refugee.85 An
individual’s “refugee” or “economic migrant” designation, thus, has a
significant impact on how he or she is treated under Thai law and
policies.
Refugees from certain ethnic groups also experience different
treatment, both as a consequence of Thai law and policies and,
unofficially, by camp committees. Perhaps most notably, ethnic Shan
from Myanmar are categorically prohibited from registering as
refugees in Thailand on the grounds that, given their linguistic
similarity to the Thai, they are able to integrate into the Thai
workforce more easily than other Burmese.86 In another example,
Rohingya refugees are generally not able to access refugee
protections,87 nor are they able to legalize their status in Thailand as
migrant workers.88
80. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, ANALYSIS OF GAPS IN REFUGEE
PROTECTION CAPACITY: THAILAND 4 (2006).
81. See Brees, supra note 75, at 37.
82. Jeannie Rose C. Field, Bridging the Gap Between Refugee Rights and Reality: A
Proposal for Developing International Duties in the Refugee Context, 22 INT’L J. REFUGEE L.
512, 521 (2010).
83. AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 79.
84. See id. at 68.
85. See Jackie Pollock, What’s In a Label?, 37 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 46, 46 (2011);
see also id. at 68.
86. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 71; see also Brees, supra note 75,
at 37.
87. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 75.
88. See id. This is because legalized migrant worker status in Thailand requires a
nationality verification process, and the Rohingya (who reside mostly in western Myanmar)
are not recognized as citizens by the Burmese government. Thus, they lack the documentation
necessary to verify their nationality.
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In addition to these official differences in treatment, there have
been reports of differential treatment of ethnic groups by camp
committees. As discussed above, seven of the camps are
predominantly Karen, and two are mostly Karenni. The committees in
these camps sometimes have their own arrival assessment process: if
the committee decides that a new arrival doesn’t meet its “refugee”
criteria, the committee may allow the individual to enter, but it may
deny building materials or rations, such that the individual is
essentially forced to leave and try to live elsewhere.89 A camp
committee leader from one Karen-majority camp indicated an
assumption that only Karen were legitimate asylum seekers, and that
all other groups were simply economic migrants.90 Ethnic minority
groups have reported prejudicial determinations by the committees as
well as a general sense of being unwelcome in the camps.91
3. Thai Domestic Legal Framework Applicable to Refugees
The legal landscape in Thailand, as it relates to immigration,
relies primarily on two statutory sources and the 2014 interim
Constitution.92 These statutory sources include the Immigration Act,
which controls the legal framework for Thai immigration, and the
Nationality Act, which defines what it means to be a Thai national.93
A. Thailand’s Constitutional Framework
In the summer of 2014, Thailand’s most recent military junta,
the National Council for Peace and Order (“NCPO”), established its
power legislatively by drafting the 2014 interim Constitution.94 This
resulted from the latest in a long line of military coups that began in
1932 as Thailand transitioned from an absolute monarchy to a
constitutional democracy.95 Thailand’s constitutional history was
89. Id. at 28.
90. See id. at 50.
91. See id. at 73.
92. See Immigration Act, supra note 14; Nationality Act, supra note 14; Rattha
Thammanun Haeng Ratcha Anachak [CONSTITUTION ] July 22, 2014 (Thai.).
93. Immigration Act, supra note 14; Nationality Act, supra note 14.
N EWS
(Oct.
13,
2016),
94. Thailand
profile
timeline,
BBC
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15641745 (describing the timeline of events in Thai
history).
95. Id.

344

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:2

shaped by these changes in power between factions. The coup in 1932
began a cycle of new factions legitimizing their power by suspending
existing Constitutions and establishing new ones.96 For instance,
during the era following World War II (amidst the creation of
international law), Thailand experienced an era of legal and
governmental uncertainty following the assassination of King Ananda
in 1946.97 Here again, a military coup filled the power vacuum in
Thailand until a new Constitution was promulgated in 1978.98
The coup that produced the 2014 interim Constitution was
brought about by the climax of tensions between the “Red Shirts” and
the “Yellow Shirts,” two opposed political movements in Thailand.99
The Red Shirts were populists who supported policies favoring rural
villagers in Thailand’s north, while the Yellow Shirts represented
Bangkok’s middle class urban elite.100 Their tensions revolved around
the removal of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a divisive populist
figure whose sister Yingluck Shinawatra later took power in 2011.101
In 2013, she proposed legislation that would have granted legal
immunity to Thaksin Shinawatra and his affiliates.102 This triggered a
wave of violence between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts,
where the Yellow Shirts wanted to end the involvement of the
Shinawatra family in politics.103 In 2014, Yingluck Shinawatra was
removed from office by the Thai Constitutional Court, further
angering the Red Shirts.104 This brought about a peak in violence
between the two groups that ultimately motivated the military to
intervene.105 The military began running the country in May 2014,
after six months of political crisis.106 The 2014 interim Constitution,
problematic as it may be, was drafted in large part in response to the
problems of political corruption that motivated the coup in the first

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Catherine E. Shoichet, Thailand Coup: A cheat sheet to get you up to speed, CNN
(May 23, 2014, 8:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/21/world/asia/thailand-crisis-up-tospeed/ (describing the Thai coup).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
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place; however, it was always meant as a temporary framework.107
Yet despite the junta leading several rounds attempting to broker a
new permanent constitution, as of the date of publication, the 2014
interim Constitution has not been superseded and still remains the
supreme law of Thailand.108
B. Thai Government Structure
Thai government structure is considered to be a constitutional
monarchy, meaning that the King is head of state, but the lawmaking
power resides with an elected parliament.109 At the time of the 2014
coup, the King of Thailand, Bhumibol Adulyadej, who passed away
in October 2016, had been in power for nearly sixty-eight years and
was the longest reigning monarch in the world.110 King Bhumibol
Adulyadej had been a constant figure during Thailand’s many past
coups.111 In fact, the only provision from the 2007 Constitution that
carried over into the subsequent 2014 Constitution was Section 2,
which establishes the monarchy and the King as head of state.112
Otherwise, the 2014 interim Constitution repealed the preceding 2007
Constitution almost in its entirety.113 Thai reverence for the King is
also embedded in the Thai Criminal Code, which contains lèse

107. See id.; see also Ankit Panda, Thailand Establishes Interim Constitution, The
Diplomat (Jul. 24, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/thailand-establishes-interimconstitution/.
108. Aukkarapon Niyomyat & Orathai Sriring, New Thai constitution shot down,
spelling prolonged military rule, Reuters (Sept. 6, 2015, 5:44 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-politics-constitution-idUSKCN0R605H20150906;
see also Richard C. Paddock, Thailand Junta Seeks to Extend Its Power With Constitutional
Referendum, New York Times (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/world/
asia/thailand-referendum-constitution.html.
109. The World Factbook, U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE A GENCY (Nov. 3, 2016),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/th.html (describing the
governmental structure of Thailand).
110. Dennis Lynch, Thailand Monarchy Crisis 2014: Sickly King And Unpopular Heir
Makes For An Uncertain Future, INT’L B US. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2014, 4:28 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/thailand-monarchy-crisis-2014-sickly-king-unpopular-heir-makesuncertain-future-1736815) (discussing the role of the monarchy in Thai society).
111. See id.; see also Angela Dewan & Kocha Olarn, Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej
dies at 88, CNN (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/13/asia/thai-king-bhumiboladulyadej-dies/.
112. Compare Rattha Thammanun Haeng Ratcha Anachak [C ONSTITUTION ] July 22,
2014 (Thai.) with Rattha Thammanun Haeng Ratcha Anachak Thai Phuttha Sakkarat
Song Phan Ha Roi Ha Sip [C ONSTITUTION ], Aug. 24, 2007 (Thai.).
113. See supra note 110.
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majesté laws that criminalize any critique of the King.114 Despite the
King’s prominence in Thai society, the 2014 interim Constitution
allocates the majority of the administrative power to the military
junta.115
There are four main branches of the Thai government, all of
which are controlled by the military government (“NCPO”): the
National Reform Council, the Constitution Drafting Committee, the
National Legislative Assembly, and the Constitutional Court.116 The
National Reform Council is charged with carrying out political
reforms in Thailand after the 2014 coup.117 This includes devising
national policies on economics, education, and public administration
generally.118 The members of the National Reform Council are
handpicked as representatives by the NCPO and they each represent
their respective provinces.119 While technically, the members of the
National Legislative Assembly are appointed by the King, the
possible appointees are selected by the NCPO.120 Likewise, the
members of the Constitution Drafting Committee are also handpicked
by the NCPO, and then appointed by the National Reform Council—
which is itself comprised of a member pool selected exclusively by
the NCPO.121 The National Legislative Assembly is a unicameral
legislature composed of 220 appointees who are in charge of writing
bills.122 However, the King retains the power to veto any bill,
according to section fifteen of the 2014 interim Constitution.123 While
the King plays a political role in the governance process, the military
junta is responsible for choosing the people who fill these government
positions.124 Taken together, these structural elements concentrate
power in the hands of the military junta. This governmental structure
114. Thailand’s Lese Majeste Laws Explained, BBC N EWS (June 10, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15641745 (analyzing the laws that criminalize critique
and defamation of the royal family).
115. Thailand’s new king rejects the army’s proposed constitution, ECONOMIST (Jan. 14,
2017), http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21714298-all-wrong-reasons-thailands-new-kingrejects-armys-proposed-constitution.
116. See Rattha Thammanun Haeng Ratcha Anachak [C ONSTITUTION ] July 22, 2014
(Thai.).
117. See id. §§ 27, 31.
118. See id.
119. See id. §§ 28, 30.
120. See id. § 6.
121. See id. §§ 28, 32.
122. See id. §§ 28, 31.
123. See id. § 15.
124. See id. §§ 27, 31.
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is one of the reasons why Thailand is unable to ensure the protection
of rights in conformity with international standards.
The NCPO has the constitutional authority to curtail the
protection of human rights as it sees fit absent of subjection to any
judicial review.125 Furthermore, the governmental structure laid out
above impedes access to justice in Thailand because it establishes the
military junta’s stronghold over the legal system. The 2014
Constitution gives immunity to NCPO members, meaning that since
they cannot be prosecuted for human rights abuses of any kind under
Section 48 of the 2014 Constitution, the NCPO and its affiliates are
immune from being held liable for any wrongdoing.126 This provision
applies to their actions before and after the passage of the 2014
Constitution.127
C. Thai Immigration Law
Thai immigration law is controlled by the Thai Immigration Act,
which regulates who may enter, exit, and reside in Thailand.128 The
Immigration Act defines an “alien” as “anyone who is not of Thai
nationality.”129 The Nationality Act defines anyone born to Thai
parents (jus sanguinis) or born on Thai soil (jus solis) as having “Thai
nationality.”130 The Ministry of the Interior is the Thai authority
responsible for regulating immigration flow.131 The Immigration
Commission is the governmental body responsible for the approval of
any petitions to enter or exit the country.132 Under Section 16 of the
Immigration Act, the Ministry can decide to deny entry to anyone for
a cause they determine to be appropriate.133 Section 16 cites reasons
like “national welfare or safeguarding the public peace, culture,
morality, or welfare,” but ultimately it is legal for an alien to be

125. Thailand: Interim Constitution Provides Sweeping Powers, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(July 24, 2014, 10:57 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/24/thailand-interimconstitution-provides-sweeping-powers (critiquing the 2014 Interim Constitution for granting
too much authority to the Thai government).
126. Rattha Thammanun Haeng Ratcha Anachak [C ONSTITUTION ] July 22, 2014, § 48
(Thai.).
127. See id.
128. Immigration Act, supra note 14.
129. See id. § 4.
130. Nationality Act, supra note 14, § 7.
131. Immigration Act, supra note 14, § 5.
132. See id. § 6-10.
133. See id. § 16.
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denied entry “when the Minister considers it improper to allow any
alien or any group of aliens to enter into the Kingdom.”134
In addition to these bureaucratic barriers to entry, the Ministry
also imposes financial barriers.135 The Ministry places significant
economic burdens on all aliens seeking permission to live or work in
Thailand. Applicants are required to pay fees when reapplying for
temporary status,136 when petitioning for reentry,137 and when they are
detained or deported.138 Additionally, the cost of detention is paid for
entirely by the detainee, according to Section 54 of the Immigration
Act.139
While the Immigration Act grants the Ministry the ability to
detain violators of immigration law, it makes no mention of how
Thailand will handle refugees.140 Broadly speaking, Thailand has no
formal refugee law or asylum seeking process at all.141 As a result, the
Ministry can use its discretion to handle immigration detention,
refugee flow, and refugee camp administration.142 Before refugees are
even classified, counted, and moved into camps, they must proceed
through parts of the Thai immigration bureaucracy described above.
This sometimes results in the arbitrary detention of those who could
potentially acquire refugee status.143
4. Myanmar: Conditions in Country of Origin
Myanmar is the country from where these refugees in question
originated, and the country to which they could presumably be
returned by Thai authorities; because of this, conditions in Myanmar
can be an important consideration in determining whether some
human rights of some these refugees have been, or could be,
134. See id.
135. See, e.g., Immigration Act, supra note 14, § 92 (listing fees related to immigration
in Thailand).
136. Id. §§ 35, 36, & 92.
137. Id. § 39.
138. Id. § 54.
139. Id.
140. Immigration Act, supra note 14.
141. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15 (describing Thailand’s treatment of
refugees).
142. See id.
143. See, e.g., Joshua Lipes, Thai Court Rules Year-Long Detention of Suspected
Uyghurs Is Legal, R ADIO FREE A SIA (March 27, 2015), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/
uyghur/ruling-03272015163643.html (describing the detention of the suspected Uyghur
group).
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violated.144 The armed conflict in Myanmar remains the “longest
running civil war in the world.”145 In terms of civil conflicts, the
country was home to the most violence in the world between 1946
and 2008, averaging four conflicts per year for a total of 246 “conflict
years” over that span.146 Displacement due to violence, repression,
and unacceptable living conditions has primarily affected two groups
of Burmese people: ethnic minorities and political opponents of the
military regime.147
Following the 1962 coup d’état that placed Burma under
permanent military control,148 General Ne Win consolidated power by
replacing regional, ethnicity-based state councils with a system
directly under the control of the central Burmese government.149 Ne
Win’s regime then pursued the “Four Cuts” counterinsurgency policy,
isolating ethnic minorities by cutting off food, funding, recruits, and
communications to targeted communities.150 In 1984, the Burmese
government launched a major offensive against the armed ethnic
group Karen National Union (“KNU”) that eventually displaced
10,000 refugees into camps across the Thai border.151 These initial
refugees were mostly civilians who had suffered human rights abuses
by the Burmese military (and its local proxies) under the Four Cuts
policy.152 Although many of them expected to return to Burma once
the violence faded, tens of thousands more Burmese refugees soon
joined them in Thailand after fleeing similar attacks throughout Karen
and Karenni states.153
144. See infra, Part III.
145. History of Armed Opposition, BURMA LINK, http://www.burmalink.org/
background/burma/dynamics-of-ethnic-conflict/history-of-armed-opposition/ (last updated
Oct. 10, 2014).
146. HUMAN SEC. REPORT PROJECT, HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 2009/2010 13 (2011),
available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx.
147. See AMNESTY INT’L, THE REPRESSION OF ETHNIC MINORITY ACTIVISTS IN
MYANMAR 7-10 (Feb. 2010). See generally id.
148. See BURMA: A COUNTRY STUDY 58 (Frederica M. Bunge ed., 1983); see also CHISHAD LIANG, BURMA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS: NEUTRALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 23–24
(1990).
149. See BURMA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 148, at 63-64.
150. See EMMA LARKIN, FINDING GEORGE ORWELL IN BURMA 215–19 (2004); History
of Conflict and The Border, BURMA LINK, http://www.burmalink.org/background/thailandburma-border/history-of-conflict-and-the-border/ (last updated May 1, 2015).
151. See History of Armed Opposition, supra note 145.
152. See id.
153. See Refugee Camps, BURMA LINK, http://www.burmalink.org/background/thailandburma-border/displaced-in-thailand/refugee-camps/ (last updated Apr. 27, 2015).
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Various obstacles hindered the refugees’ attempts to return to
Myanmar—which officially changed its name from Burma in 1989,
including the destruction of their villages, crops, and livestock, and
the emplacement of landmines along the most accessible routes
between the countries.154 Additionally, several hundred thousand
more Karens, Karennis, and Mons remained internally displaced
during this time, leaving their homes for similar reasons as the
refugees, but remained in Myanmar due to geographical or
government barriers.155 In the country’s west, approximately 200,000
Rohingya Muslims also fled, seeking refuge in Bangladesh after the
Burmese government employed similar tactics against them.156
Beginning in 1995, the Burmese government used proxy militias
to launch a series of cross-border offensives in areas around the Thai
camps, forcing inhabitants to retreat within the camp confines and
abandon any means of independently sustaining themselves.157 No
longer able to forage for food and shelter materials, refugees soon had
to rely for survival on direct aid from the Thai government and other
outside sources.158 This dependency further restricted their ability—
and desire—to return to Burma, where they still had no guarantee of
protection, and camp conditions quickly deteriorated.159
Much international attention has focused on the situation in
Myanmar after the government transitioned to a civilian government
with the election of the Union Solidarity and Development Party
(“USDP”) in November 2010 and the swearing in of Thein Sein as
then president in March 2011. This political transition and the
granting of other civil and political rights engendered optimism about
Myanmar’s future where the international community has raced
forward, lifting many sanctions against Myanmar, increasing
international investment, and providing significant international

154. See id.
155. See Displaced in Burma, BURMA LINK, http://www.burmalink.org/background/
thailand-burma-border/displaced-in-burma/ (last updated Apr. 29, 2015); see also H UM. R TS.
WATCH, THEY C AME AND D ESTROYED O UR V ILLAGE A GAIN: THE PLIGHT OF
INTERNALLY D ISPLACED PERSONS IN K AREN S TATE (June 2005); H UM. R TS. WATCH ,
THE MON: PERSECUTED IN B URMA, PUSHED B ACK FROM T HAILAND (Dec. 1994).
156. See H UM. R TS. WATCH, THE R OHINGYA M USLIMS: ENDING A C YCLE OF
EXODUS (1996).
157. See History of Armed Opposition, supra note 145.
158. See id.
159. See id.
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assistance funding.160 Meanwhile, insurgency movements remain
along the border and mass displacement continues.161 Sending signals
of confidence to the Myanmar leadership could allow the government,
even the currently democratically elected government, to continue to
commit human rights abuses with impunity and prematurely indicate
to the international community that conditions are ripe for refugees to
return to Myanmar. Determining whether it is safe for a refugee to
return needs to be an individuated process.162 Forcing refugees to
return to Myanmar before it is safe to do so constitutes a violation of
the non-refoulement principle under international law.163
There are various ongoing insurgency movements that represent
the Karen and Karenni ethnic groups and have varying degrees of
resolution in their peace processes.164 In January 2012, the Karen
National Unity party signed a ceasefire with the government of
Myanmar. Although signing this ceasefire agreement was a
momentous occasion in the peace process,165 there have been armed
clashes reported intermittently since August 2013 alongside peace
negotiations.166 Conditions in Karen State remain tense and ongoing
conflict in the area suggests that conditions may not yet be ripe for
return.
The Karenni insurgency movements are not waging as active of
a resistance role since the Karenni National Progressive Party
160. See PATRICK PIERCE & CAITLIN RIEGER, MYANMAR: NAVIGATING PATHS TO
JUSTICE IN MYANMAR’S TRANSITION 1, 5 (June 2014), available at
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Myanmar-Development-Report-2014.pdf.
161. See Conflicts, Communal Violence and IDPs, MYANMAR PEACE MONITOR
http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/conflict/conflict-overview (last visited Feb. 1, 2017); see
e.g., TBC PROGRAM REP., supra note 21.
162. See U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, 3, ¶ 28 (Dec. 2011), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/3d58e13b4/handbook-procedures-criteriadetermining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html.
163. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES, art. 33(1) (July 28, 1951) (“No Contracting State shall expel or return
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.”).
PEACE
MONITOR,
164. See
Peace
Process
Overview,
MYANMAR
http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/peace-process/peace-process-overview (last visited Feb. 1,
2017).
165. See Burma government signs ceasefire with Karen rebels, BBC NEWS (Jan. 12,
2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16523691.
MYANMAR
PEACE
MONITOR,
166. Monitoring
Archive,
http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/research/monitoring-archive (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
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(“KNPP”) signed a ceasefire in July 2012 and has been consistently
holding peace talks with the government.167 Other Karenni
movements are Border Guard Forces, co-opted by the Myanmar
Government.168 The fact that there is no ongoing conflict in Kayah
State does not mean that the conditions are safe for the Karenni to
return, particularly since the Border Guard Forces are under
government control169 and may require the Karenni people to work
for defense services against their will.170
Numerous other insurgency movements are operating along
Myanmar’s borders,171 and the engagement of these groups will be
critical for the achievement of a comprehensive peace process. One
potential solution is a federalist system that reflects the inclusion of
the demands of various ethnic minority groups in a revised
Constitution. This could help to transition ceasefire agreements to
long-term, sustainable peace.172 Even with various tenuous ceasefire
agreements currently in place, until the Constitution has been revised
to lessen military control, many Burmese people are likely to be wary
for prospects of peace and will not likely feel safe returning home.173

167. See id.
PEACE
MONITOR,
168. See
Armed
Ethnic
Groups,
MYANMAR
http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/armed-ethnic-groups (last visited Feb. 1, 2017)
(these groups include: Karenni National People’s Liberation Front, Karenni National Peace
and Development Party, Karenni National Development Party/Army, and Karenni National
Unity and Solidarity Organization).
PEACE
MONITOR
169. Border
Guard
Force
Scheme,
MYANMAR
http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/background/border-guard-force (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
170. See K AREN H UMAN R IGHTS G RP., TRUCE OR TRANSITION : TRENDS IN H UMAN
R IGHTS A BUSE AND LOCAL R ESPONSE IN SOUTHEAST MYANMAR SINCE THE 2012
C EASEFIRE 54 (2014), available at http://www.khrg.org/sites/default/files/khrg_-_truce_or
_transition_-_english.pdf [hereinafter TRUCE OR TRANSITION ].
171. Conflict Alerts, MYANMAR PEACE MONITOR http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/
conflict (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
172. See Janelle Saffin & Nathan Willis, The Need for a Constitutional Settlement to
Further the Reform Process in Myanmar (Burma), 28 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 253, 269-71,
276-84 (2014).
173. See e.g., Marm Sart Khiang, 2008 Constitution: What Needs To Be Changed?,
NEWS
INT’L
(Mar.
29,
2012,
2:25
PM),
http://eBURMA
archive.bnionline.net/index.php/feature/bni/12892-2008-constitution-what-needs-to-bechanged.html.
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A. Conditions in Kayin (Karen) State
People in Kayin State are predominantly dependent upon animal
husbandry and agriculture for their livelihoods.174 Access to social
services, including health and education, is poor and has declined
with the reduction of KNU’s territorial control over Kayin State.175 Of
major concern is the budding interest in development projects in the
region for mining, dam construction, large-scale agricultural projects,
rubber plantations, and army camps,176 which will impede individuals
from engaging in their own agricultural and animal husbandry
practices.177 In addition, these development projects will likely lead to
widespread land grabs and displacement of Karen people without
adequate compensation. A pattern has already been documented of
confiscation of land by the Tatmadaw.178
Although there are reports since the ceasefire that people in
Kayin State feel somewhat safer to move around, it continues to be
unstable.179 Since the ceasefire, the Tatmadaw continues to build
new—and bolster old—army bases. Troops rotate, skirmishes
between armed groups continue, and weapons, ammunition, and
rations are consistently resupplied.180 These conditions have led to
mistrust of the ceasefire and the Tatmadaw, as well as continued
insecurity.181 There were reported instances of arbitrary arrest without
a formal charge or access to due process as a result of acts such as
suspected KNU collaboration, not having identification, running a
business that competed with a Tatmadaw-run business, or traveling in
a limited military operation area.182 Instances of torture, cruel,
174. See U.N. H IGH C OMMISSIONER FOR R EFUGEES, KAYIN STATE PROFILE 7 (2014),
available at http://data.unhcr.org/thailand/download.php?id=223 [hereinafter KAYIN STATE
PROFILE].
175. See id. at 8.
176. See TRUCE OR TRANSITION, supra note 170, at 90 (noting that development
projects include the Asian Development Bank’s construction of the Asia Highway as part of
the Greater Mekong sub-region initiative); see also KAYIN STATE PROFILE, supra note 174, at
8.
177. KAYIN STATE PROFILE, supra note 174, at 8.
178. See TRUCE OR TRANSITION, supra note 170, at 89; see generally K AREN H UMAN.
R IGHTS G RP., LOSING G ROUND: LAND C ONFLICTS AND C OLLECTIVE A CTION IN
EASTERN MYANMAR (Mar. 2013), available at http://www.khrg.org/sites/default/files/
losinggroundkhrg-march2013-fulltext.pdf.
179. TRUCE OR TRANSITION, supra note 170, at 10, 106.
180. Id. at 106-17.
181. Id. at 116.
182. Id. at 32.
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inhuman or degrading treatment, and sexual violence perpetrated by
the Tatmadaw have been reported since the ceasefire was signed in
2012.183 Although overall levels of forced labor have declined and are
requested for shorter periods, this practice still continues.184 Forced
recruitment into the Tatmadaw and Border Guard Forces remains an
issue where individuals are coerced to join these forces against their
will, are required to remain enlisted for longer than their term, or are
taxed in lieu of enlistment.185 Furthermore, these demands to enlist
are accompanied by implicit or explicit threats of violence, frequently
compelling these individuals to comply with enlistment demands.186
Taxes were also arbitrarily levied on people passing through military
checkpoints with industrial, livestock, or agricultural products.187
Landmines also pose significant threats to individuals’
livelihood and security throughout Kayin State. Landmines remain
planted throughout Kayin State, most frequently protecting current or
former Tatmadaw camps, and occasionally around agricultural areas
or water sources.188 New mines have also allegedly been planted since
the 2012 ceasefire, but with decreased frequency.189 The prevalence
of landmines throughout the region has widespread implications for
the mobility of the Kayin people and their livelihoods due to the
difficulty of farming or raising livestock.190
B. Conditions in Kayah (Karenni) State
UNHCR estimates suggest that there are 15,000 Karenni
refugees living in Thailand, and roughly ten percent of the population
in Kayah State has been internally displaced from the conflict.191
Kayah State is a heavily forested, rural, mountainous state that is rich
in natural resources, namely minerals, timber, and hydropower.192
Kayah State is one of the most heavily landmine contaminated areas
183. Id. at 32-42.
184. Id. at 46.
185. Id. at 54. Being required to pay a tax that may be prohibitively expensive still does
not provide an individual with the choice of whether or not to enlist, meaning that this cannot
constitute voluntary enlistment.
186. Id. at 55.
187. Id. at 78-86 (providing additional details on taxation related challenges).
188. See id. at 61-63.
189. See id. at 61.
190. See id. at 65-66.
191. See NINA SCHULER, K AYAH STATE S OCIOECONOMIC A NALYSIS 9 (2013),
available at www.data.unhcr.org/thailand/download.php?id=206.
192. See id. at 2, 19.

2017]

CROWLEY REPORT

355

in Myanmar.193 Despite terms in the KNPP’s ceasefire agreement
with the government, the government has not begun any surveys in
the region to determine which communities are affected by
landmines.194 Although the landmine-related casualties have
decreased since the ceasefire, any internally displaced persons or
refugees returning home would be greatly at risk of incurring
landmine-related injuries as a result of not knowing where landmines
may be buried.195

Within the international community, there has been much
optimism for Myanmar’s future prospects for peace as a result of the
initial transition from military rule to Thein Sein’s government and
the subsequent transition to a democratically elected government.
Although there has been notable reform in shifting the legal
framework of civil and political rights, many of these changes ring
hollow for Burmese citizens. Rights to assembly, freedom of
expression, and the right to vote are largely unrealized. Prospects for
constitutional reform are bleak. Due to the central role that
constitutional reform occupies in ethnic insurgency movements,
conflict within the Border States is likely to remain.196 The ceasefire
in Kayin State has not been respected, as evidenced by skirmishes,
ongoing militarization, and forced conscription. Conditions in Kayah
State are comparatively better, yet the State is still riddled with
landmines and is likely to have its natural resources exploited for
Myanmar’s economic development.
Conditions in Kayin and Kayah States remain insecure. Until the
peace process provides meaningful participation for diverse ethnic
minority groups, it is unlikely that conditions will be sufficiently safe
within Myanmar for refugees to return. A large influx of returning
refugees could also exacerbate already unstable conditions, especially
if that influx interferes with the extraction of valuable resources, or if
it creates tension between competing land ownership claims. As a
result, any country that begins to return refugees before conditions are
193. See Ceasefire but No Demining in Myanmar’s Kayah State, IRIN ASIA (July 25,
2014),
http://www.irinnews.org/report/100404/ceasefire-but-no-demining-in-myanmar-skayah-state.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. See Saffin & Willis, supra note 172, at 253, 269-71, 276-84.
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safe for return will be in violation of their international legal
obligations of non-refoulement.197

b. Research Findings
1. Access to Necessary Resources & Services

“Everything is in a box. Access to services, including
healthcare, education, food, and movement in and out
of camps is very limited. I feel like everything is
restricted. I feel like I am inside a box.”198
A. Food
Thailand’s tightening of its restrictions on freedom of movement
and work has taken place immediately following significant decreases
in donor funding for camp support.199 Donor fatigue, the global
financial crisis, and a perception by international funders that the
situation in Myanmar is changing have led to both an overall decrease
in funding and a shift of existing funding from camp support in
Thailand to direct support for programs in Myanmar.200 Despite this
197. See infra, Part III. Even countries that have not signed the 1951 Convention and its
1967 Optional Protocol are required to respect the obligation of non-refoulement as a principle
of customary international law. See Scott A. Vignos, Pirate Trials: An Examination of the
United States’ Non-Refoulement Duties Pursuant to the United Nations Convention Against
Torture, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 193, 206 (2010).
198. Interview with refugee, Refugee Focus Group, in Thailand (Interviewee #13) (May
2015) [Interview records on file with Leitner Center].
199. Interview with NGO Staff Person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview records on
file with Leitner Center] (“After the coup, the dependency on rations increased at a time when
the rations are decreasing the most.”); see Leitner Ctr. for Int’l Law and Justice, 2015 Crowley
Program Report (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2015 Crowley
Manuscript].
200. For example, as foreign attention shifts toward the Myanmar side of the border,
donors have fewer resources to devote to those refugees who are unwilling or unable to return.
See BORDER CONSORTIUM, PROGRAMME REPORT JANUARY-JUNE 2015 65 (2015) [hereinafter
TBC JANUARY–JUNE 2015 PROGRAM REP.]; See also AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra
note 15, at 18 & 29.. Donor fatigue also increases with the intractability of the refugee crisis
and apparent lack of political progress between minority groups and the Myanmar
government. Moreover, the global financial crisis continues to impact state budgets for foreign
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decrease in support to the camps, the Thai government has not
supplemented its own funding, supplies, or services, but instead has
moved in the opposite direction by selectively enforced unwritten
policies that ultimately make it even more difficult for refugees to
meet their most basic needs.
NGOs provide only limited resources in the camps, and the
inability of refugees’ ability to secure additional income and
resources outside the camps due to Thai law and policies results in the
negative impact on their fundamental rights in a variety of areas
including food, shelter, healthcare, and education.201 As one refugee
commented, “Reductions are not only for rations. All services have
been reduced. Health, rations, education, everything.”202 Many
refugees have noted that these cuts in rations and decreases in
essential services are among the major problems in the camps.203
When asked why the level of support has decreased, interviewees
offered a number of conjectures. A Karenni refugee in Na Soi Camp
reported, “One [reason] we have heard was because there is less
interest by donors and also higher prices and poor exchange rates.”204
Another said, “Also maybe the resettlement program, because donors
and people think the camp populations should be smaller, but it’s still
the same population. Donors are focused on development, so funds
for relief are reduced.”205 Still another commented, “Because there are
so many refugees around the world, so the money goes to them now
instead of us.”206 But for most, their explanation was echoed in the

assistance, as well as the political will to maintain them. See Era Dabla-Norris et al., Will the
Recent Economic Downturn, Large Shocks, and Debt Strains in Donor Countries Have a
Ripple Effect on Bilateral Aid?, VOX EU (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.voxeu.org/article/impactglobal-crisis-aid-flows-it-over-yet. Finally, emerging refugee and migrant crises around the
world promise to further draw public attention away from Burmese refugees. See TBC
JANUARY–JUNE 2015 PROGRAM REP., supra.
201. TBC JANUARY–JUNE 2015 PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 200.
202. Interview with refugee, Refugee Focus Group, in Thailand (Interviewees # 1, 4, &
12) (May 2015) [Interview records on file with Leitner Center].
203. Interview with multiple refugees in focus group, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview
record on file with Leitner Center].
204. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview records on file with
Leitner Center].
205. Interview with refugee, Refugee Focus Group, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview
records on file with Leitner Center].
206. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
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reply of one refugee, which was simply, “I don’t know why . . . I just
know there is not enough food.”207
i. Funding Shortfalls
As one NGO staff person reported:
Funding is quickly depleting . . . [we] might not be able to
provide the required support in 2016. Eighty percent of our
funding goes to food and [we are] the only food provider [in the
camps], so this will be a significant problem. Long-term funders
are committed, but this might not be enough.208

Most of the refugees we interviewed commented that lack of food
was one of the biggest challenges they were facing.209 Camp residents
suffered from chronic malnutrition and anemia even before NGOs
announced in 2011 that they could no longer meet international
minimum nutrition standards for Burmese refugees in the camps.210
Typically, rations consist of some combination of rice, oil, salt, flour
yellow bean, charcoal, Asia Mix (a vitamin supplement), and
sometimes fish paste. Water is supplied from camp wells that
environmental groups are responsible for keeping clean.211
However, beginning in 2012, the situation became even less
tenable as rations began to be cut in the camps.212 Many refugees
reported continuing decreases in food amounts.213 In 2011, all
refugees received at least fifteen kilograms of rice per month. Even
those few refugees deemed vulnerable or most vulnerable now
207. Id.
208. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
209. Interview with multiple refugees in focus group, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview
records on file with Leitner Center].
210. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 35; see also Food
Assistance, BORDER CONSORTIUM, http://www.theborderconsortium.org/what-we-do/thailand/
food-assistance/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Food Assistance]; TBC JANUARY–
JUNE 2015 PROGRAM REP., supra note 200; id. The “standard” rice ration for adult refugees
was decreased to 9 kilograms (kg) per person, per month (pp/pm) from 10 kg pp/pm. Some
refugees falling into the “vulnerable” category also saw a reduction to 11 kg pp/pm from 12 kg
pp/pm.
211. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
212. Interview with refugee, Refugee Focus Group, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview
records on file with Leitner Center].
213. “For large families (ten or more people), there is not enough food to go around. And
the ration is only rice, so we have to find other food on our own.” Interview with Camp
Refugee, in Thailand (May 2015), in 2015 Crowley Manuscript, supra note 199.
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receive only twelve or 13.5 kilograms per month, respectively—a
significant reduction, especially considering that refugees were
experiencing the effects of malnutrition even with the fifteen
kilograms per month in 2011.214 Leaving aside these reductions for
most vulnerable populations, the decline in the standard allotment for
the majority of the refugee population is even more substantial. For
example, whereas a typical individual received fifteen kilograms of
rice per month in 2011, in 2012 that individual received only 13.5
kilograms, and that amount soon declined to twelve kilograms and
then to ten kilograms; some refugees have even reported that they
now receive only eight or nine kilograms for the standard
allotment.215 In light of this succession of cuts, rations in 2015
amounted to no more than a standard per person allotment of 1505
kilocalories per day, 39.5 percent below the minimum international
standard, with additional cuts to rice and charcoal occurring in
September 2015 [following our May 2015 field research visit].216
NGOs are concerned ration reductions will continue.217
All of the refugees that we interviewed confirmed that current
rations are not enough to sustain them, and many must look for other
options to fill the gap—options that have been greatly curtailed given
the new restrictions on movement into and out of the camps.218 Some
refugees noted that reduced rations have led to emotional stress
among many in the camps.219 In particular, one interviewee said,
“After the reductions in rations, people started to have emotional
issues, stress, depression, [especially] because they can’t go outside
the camp to work.”220 NGO workers commented that now most
refugees have issues with daily survival, including their access to

214. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
215. Interviews with staff members from two separate NGOs (May 2015) [Interview
records on file with Leitner Center]; see also Interview with NGO staff person (May 2015)
[Interview record on file with Leitner Center].
216. See TBC January–June 2015 Program Report, supra note 200, at 25; see also
BORDER CONSORTIUM, PROGRAMME REPORT JUNE-DECEMBER 2015 17 (2015).
217. See id. at 26-28.
218. Interview with multiple refugees in all focus groups, in Thailand (May 2015)
[Interview records on file with Leitner Center].
219. Interview with multiple refugees in focus group, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview
records on file with Leitner Center].
220. Interview with refugee, Refugee Focus Group, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview
record on file with Leitner Center].
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coal, oil, rice, and fish paste.221 This also has an attendant social
impact: refugees feel restricted in their interactions (e.g., going to a
friend’s house for dinner).222 One service provider said, “Essentially,
no food security also means no mental security; the ration was never
enough, but now it’s even worse.”223
ii. Need for Outside Sources
Refugees also reported that, while in critical need of
supplemental food supplies, they are unable to provide for themselves
because they cannot leave the camps to obtain needed resources.224
Traditionally, refugees were able to supplement their limited rations
by gathering food in surrounding areas or working outside of the
camps to gain income to purchase additional food items.225 As one
refugee camp committee member told us:
They don’t go far—and almost always for work with local Thais.
There [was] an understanding with the Thai authorities about
this, but refugees are also limited by the geography. They can’t
go very far because of all the mountains around here.226

In some cases, refugees continue to have tacit understandings with
local Thai authorities, or they manage to find ways around camp
entrances and exits.227 One refugee noted that “Thai authorities are
sometimes not a problem close to the camp, but if we go farther than
five villages away it becomes a problem. We avoid the official camp
gates.”228 Another said:
221. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Refugees in Mae La camp report the need to leave the camps to acquire food from
outside, but that doing so costs too much money or puts the refugee at risk of arrest. See id.,
which contains one refugee’s statement that “[t]he rations have decreased. Now you need to
leave the camp to buy outside food, but to leave you need to get permission or pay the camp
guard 500 baht. I was caught leaving by the police once. I had 400 baht with me, and he took
200. He let me keep going after he took 200.”
225. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
226. Interview with refugee camp committee member, in Thailand (May 2015)
[Interview record on file with Leitner Center].
227. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
228. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
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As rations decrease, camp residents need to leave the camp to
buy outside food, but to leave you need to get permission or pay
the camp guard 500 baht. I was caught leaving by the police
once. I had 400 baht with me, and he took 200. He let me keep
going after he took 200.229

A third interviewee added, “[t]hey [Thai authorities] really want them
[refugees] to return to Burma.”230 All of the interviewees agreed that,
since the coup, movement in and out of the camps has been restricted.
One interviewee explained:
This has impacted the economy inside the camps, especially
because refugees now need to supplement their daily income,
food, and resources outside. Refugees are now unable to access
the economy outside the camps. After the coup, the dependency
on rations increased at a time when the rations are decreasing the
most. An informal economy was necessary after the reduction in
rations. When the coup happened, they really had to depend on
the rations more, just as they were being cut.231

iii. Lack of Land Expansion & Arrest Penalties
Refugees risk punishment if they attempt to gather or grow food
beyond camp perimeters.232 One NGO staff person working in the
camps noted that “[f]or Karen and Karenni refugees, the forest is their
food source, but in Thailand, the Department of Forestry is strong and
[refugees] can be punished for foraging or disturbing the forest.”233
Individual refugees are also not permitted to use land beyond camp
borders for farming individual plots, nor are NGOs allowed to use
non-camp land for growing food for refugees.234 As one NGO service
provider described:
[A]ll produce from our agricultural program must be sold within
the camps. Land cannot be expanded for agriculture or any other
activity . . . . Any refugee caught farming beyond these
boundaries would [also] be in violation of anti-deforestation laws
and [would be] required to pay a fine. The government has set a
boundary on camp land so it is very difficult to expand. Also,
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
233. Id.
234. Id.
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boundaries are regularly patrolled, so refugees who farm beyond
campgrounds are at risk of being arrested for deforestation. For
instance, in April 2015, a refugee who expanded his farm beyond
camp grounds was caught, and the area was closed leading to
thirty people losing their farmland.235

B. Shelter
Refugee access to shelter has also diminished, beginning with a
2011 reduction in building materials.236 Thailand only allows refugees
to build temporary shelters out of materials such as bamboo and grass
thatching, and prohibits the construction of permanent structures
made from more durable materials, limiting the integrity of the houses
in which refugees can live.237 Because refugees are denied permission
to leave the camps, refugees are prevented from acquiring additional
outside repair materials238—posing particular difficulties during the
rainy season when camp residents are prevented from adequately
protecting themselves from inclement weather.239
All supplies in the camps come from NGO providers rather than
from the Thai authorities, so refugees become completely dependent
on NGOs for all materials and services. Before restrictions on
freedom of movement and right to work took place, some refugees
would periodically leave the camps to find supplies or sources of
additional income to supplement resources.240 One refugee we
interviewed noted, “Since 2011, aid has been reduced. We do not
have enough supplies . . . .”241 Another added, “At first, the support
from [NGOs] was enough. But the last two to three years, supplies
have started getting low, and in the future it looks like it will continue
235. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
236. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 31.
237. “They call the houses in the camps ‘temporary shelters’ and will not provide more
durable roofs so that it does not turn into a long term stay.” Interview, 2015 Crowley
Manuscript, supra note 199.
238. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 31–32.
239. “An informal economy was necessary after the reduction in rations. When the coup
happened, they really had to depend on the rations more, just as they were being cut. The
material to fix houses is a part of the rations, so rainy season became an issue.” Interview with
NGO Staff Person, 2015 Crowley Manuscript, supra note 199.
240. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center]
241. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
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to be low. This is a problem for refugees.”242 A third summarized, “In
general, camp conditions are getting worse.”243
Thai authorities will not allow NGOs to provide permanent
materials to refugees for shelter construction. A UNHCR staff person
reported the Thai government “call[s] the houses in the camps
‘temporary shelters’ and will not provide more durable roofs so that it
does not turn into a long-term stay.”244 A local NGO also offered:
The material to fix houses is a part of the rations, and there are
not enough housing materials. So the rainy season becomes an
issue. Refugees are still forced to go outside the camps to find
leaves, bamboo and unofficial work.245

When asked whether he built his own hut, one refugee living in Mae
La Camp responded, “Yes. I go to the forest to get bamboo and then
[an NGO] gives me leaves for roofing. Sometimes police catch you
[and punish or fine you] for getting extra materials to build your
house from the forest.”246 Another NGO staff person reported that
now “small children are [now sometimes being sent by parents] to
gather building materials outside the camps.”247
C. Health Care
The overall funding shortage has also negatively impacted
Burmese refugees’ access to healthcare, as NGOs are no longer able
to provide essential preventative and mental health services or
hospital treatment.248 In Thailand, there is not free access to
hospitals.249 If a Thai citizen has a medical card, a hospital visit is
thirty baht, but refugees cannot acquire a medical card.250 Some
interviewees reported that, while previously any sick camp resident
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Interview with UNHCR officer, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
245. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
246. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
247. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
248. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 30–33.
249. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
250. Id.
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who was sick could be referred to a nearby hospital, now the
individual is only referred if his or her case is “very serious.”251 Camp
health services are limited and several interviewees said the process is
very slow and only remedial treatments are available.252
In general, there is less donor support for health services overall.
“NGOs don’t want to send people to the hospital, because the expense
is very high,” one camp resident told us.253 Another added:
They want to save the money for more patients instead of
spending lots of money on one patient. Also, the decision to send
someone to a hospital isn’t made by the clinic staff. The doctor
from the NGO makes the decision, because the NGO pays for the
transportation to the hospital.254

In parallel to declining rations and other services, camps have also
seen an increase in mental health issues.255 One organization
operating in the camps described the sharp increase in emotional
stress and depression they have seen, with an even more noticeable
effect on families with children.256 This organization reported that
they have seen cases in which children start to hustle and steal
because of constraints on provisions.257 This causes even greater
stress for their parents. As one staff worker commented, “Because of
the reduction [in services], there is a lot of emotional problems and
depression. It is especially hard on the parents. There is [also now]
more domestic violence in the camps.”258 Another camp service
provider told us, “In 2014-15, there have been lots of issues linked
with unnatural deaths [suicides]. This is linked to stress from daily
live, including economic restrictions, and decrease in services.”259
251. Id.; see also 2015 Crowley Manuscript, supra note 199 (quoting an interview with a
refugee in the camp saying, “[t]his situation changed recently. Before, if someone was sick,
they were referred to the Mae Hong Son hospital. Now, people are only referred if their case is
very serious (before, everyone could get referred)”).
252. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Interview with two NGO staff people from separate organizations, in Thailand
(May 2015) [Interview records on file with Leitner Center].
256. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
257. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
258. Id.
259. Id.
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The lack of trained NGO health workers and services also
creates higher dependency on Burmese doctors in the camps—a
situation that often fuels ethnic tension.260 As one NGO staff worker
explained:
Less money for health means you can’t send people to hospitals
in Thailand any more. [In the camps,] there are also many
doctors from Burma who are [ethnically] Burman. They have
replaced some of the international doctors. This has led to ethnic
distrust because the patients are largely Karen. Most refugees are
there because of conflict and don’t feel safe with a Burman
doctor.261

D. Education
Finally, the refugee education system is no longer affordable for
many families because of increased tuition fees.262 In 2004, UNHCR
coordinated the creation of an operational plan for refugee returns; as
a part of this plan, while in the camps, refugees were to be sent to
individual NGOs for health, livelihood, and educational services.263
As funding for the camps decreases, NGOs are unable to continue to
provide these services for free, which means that refugees are forced
to make up the difference in the funding shortfall. As one NGO
reported, “The international community should balance its donations
between the government and also local CBOs. There are services that
need to be provided by CBOs and they have recently been reduced—
for example, the decrease in teacher stipends.”264
Residents of Ban Mai Nai Soi and Mae La camps, for example,
reported that funding cuts have meant that families must now pay
school fees.265 As refugees in Na Soi reported:
There is now a registration fee. Before, there was no fee, but now
it is about fifty baht. This goes toward the teacher stipend . . . .
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 33.
263. Interview with UNHCR officer, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
264. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
265. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center] (“There is now a registration fee. Before, there was no fee, but now it is about
50 baht. This goes toward the teacher stipend. This change is because there is not now enough
money for teachers’ stipends, and the parents want to keep the teachers.”).
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This change is because there is not now enough money for
teachers’ stipends, and the parents want to keep the teachers.266

Refugees in other camps reported similar situations, with rates as high
as 200 baht per student, and projected further increases.267
The quality of education in the camps has also suffered, as lower
pay leads to higher turnover rates and inadequate training for
teachers.268 Several refugees we interviewed reported that, in general,
the quality of education in the camps has deteriorated because the
services are not fully supported.269 For example, the variety of
educational programming offered is decreasing.270 Some NGO
educational programs are transitioning their curriculum to focus on
more general principles.271 The number of teachers available to teach
has also been reduced due to resettlement of trained teachers or
lowered teacher stipends.272
There is a limited amount of secondary education offered in the
camps; one service provider reported that some post-tenth grade
standard educational training for teachers and health medics has been
allowed, but these programs are only limited to between thirty to forty
people a year.273 Even when secondary educational programs are
offered, certificates are not recognized outside the camps, and there
are no employment opportunities.274 One NGO officer said, “The
young people in the camps don’t know what to do with their
education. They also don’t understand the importance of
education.”275
2. Ability to Move Freely & Work
As one refugee explained:
266. Interview with two separate refugees in focus group, in Thailand (May 2015)
[Interview records on file with Leitner Center].
267. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
268. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 33–34; see also Interview with
NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with Leitner Center].
269. Interview with four separate refugees in focus group, in Thailand (May 2015)
[Interview records on file with Leitner Center].
270. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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I was born in Karen . . . . I am a camp resident, but I have to be
able to take the risk of going outside the camp to be able to help
the community. The government lets me leave sometimes if I
provide a cash payment. But they know we are here [outside the
camp], and so I can technically be arrested. Security in the
refugee camp has been tightened [since the coup]. It is very
difficult for people to leave when security is tight. When we are
not able to leave, we must even close our assistance office, which
is located just outside of the camp.276

Following the May 2014 coup and the enactment of the interim
Constitution,277 the situation for refugees on the ground has become
strikingly less secure.278 Since the coup, Thailand has more strictly
enforced prohibitions on leaving the camps.279 Camp passes granting
permission for temporary leave are more difficult to obtain and more
limited in scope and duration.280 If any written policies ever existed
detailing rules on refugee movement outside the camps, they have not
been made available to the public. Previously, whatever prohibitions
may have been in place were not enforced, allowing many refugees to
find ways of securing outside employment, building supplies, and
food.281 However, since the coup, refugees have reported that egress
has been tightly limited; many have even described instances where
Thai authorities have set up surprise checkpoints at areas surrounding
camp perimeters and arrested exiting refugees.282
276. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
277. The Constitution was passed without public consultation and with widespread
public condemnation. See Open Letter Condemning the Thai Junta’s Interim Constitution,
PRACHATAI ENG. (Jan. 8, 2014), http://prachatai.org/english/node/4262 (discussing the
shortcomings of the 2014 Constitution and arguing that the document discounts human rights).
The main critique of this Constitution is that it grants the military government immunity to
such a degree that it sanctions human rights violations. See Thailand: Interim Constitution
Provides Sweeping Powers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 25, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2014/07/24/thailand-interim-constitution-provides-sweeping-powers (critiquing the 2014
interim constitution for granting too much authority to the Thai government).
278. See TBC JANUARY-JUNE 2015 PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 200, at 10.
279. See id. at 9.
280. Refugees in Mae La camp report that camp passes now cost 200 baht and are valid
for only three days (whereas before the coup, they were valid for up to a month). See 2015
Crowley Manuscript.
281. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 31-36.
282. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center] (“I went out of the camp, and the police didn’t see me on my way out. I was
going to the city center. I walked for three to four days. Then I got sick and I wanted to go
back. But the police set up a checkpoint, and I was arrested on the way back to the camp. I
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A. Changes in Thai Policies Regarding Movement
After the coup, Thai authorities began enforcing a number of
camp policies, including severely restricting movement in and out of
the camps.283 As one resident reported:
[There have been] lots of discussions about the return issue.
Before the last few years, there was no talk about this. The Thai
government is starting to enforce some policies. Once services
are reduced, more people are cutting down trees to grow food.
Then the law policy for deforestation started to be enforced. And
there are more restrictions on movement.284

There are no public written records of these policies restricting
movement.285 Thai authorities insist that these policies have always
existed; it is just that now these policies are actually being enforced.
While some camp leaders—who can sometimes be aligned with Thai
political interests or who may feel the need to represent Thai
authorities favorably in order to maintain power for themselves or
rights for their represented communities—occasionally claimed in
interviews that movement was not restricted,286 all of the evidence
seems to point to the contrary. Right after the coup, reported
restrictions on movement were at their most severe. Even now,
restrictions are much more stringently enforced than prior to the
coup.287 The actual flexibility of those restrictions still varies
somewhat from camp to camp and in response to certain events that
take place in camps—for example, restrictions are enforced more

didn’t have my ID. I was detained for one day. I paid some money [3500 baht], and then I was
released.”); see also TBC JANUARY-JUNE 2015 PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 200, at 20.
283. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
284. Interview with two separate refugees in focus group, in Thailand (May 2015)
[Interview record on file with Leitner Center].
285. In no interview conducted by the delegation with refugees, NGO staff workers,
UNHCR officers, or Thai government officials were we able to secure, or even ascertain, the
existence of official Thai written policies restricting movement in and out of the camps
available to the public or even to refugee camp residents.
286. Interview with Saw Baw Poe, Camp Leader, in Mae Rama Luang (May 2015)
[Interview record on file with Leitner Center] (“I can’t say there have been changes here.
There are rules that refugees cannot leave the camps but these rules are not enforced.”).
287. Interview with UNHCR officer, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
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absolutely during periods when head counts of refugees are taking
place.288
There are some very limited circumstances that will allow a
refugee to gain official permission to leave the camp. One camp
resident explained, “If people go out for farming, they cannot tell the
authorities. If there is some special reason they must leave, they can
ask for permission. This would be for a big gathering, like a
dinner.”289 Staff at UNHCR clarified that, “refugees can request
access to go outside for four limited reasons: medical referral from
NGO; travel to another camp (NGO-facilitated); vocational training
(most likely coordinated by Thai actors); and humanitarian
reasons.”290
In general, refugees are aware that their ability to leave is not
what it once was. As one interviewee said:
We cannot move as easily [as we could before the coup]. It is
harder to get work. We also used to be able to visit people, but
now we have to get permission from the camp commander. The
permission is only for one week now. Before it was longer.291

Even when camp passes are issued, they are now more
expensive and allow fewer days outside the camp. As a refugee in
another camp reported, “The camp pass is only three days now—
down from one month, and the pass costs 200 baht. It is more difficult
to go outside and work.”292
Sometimes the camp pass is less official. One refugee
commented that, as for entry and exit to the camps, “you’ve got to
grease the palms on the way in,” curiously adding, “It’s not
corruption. It’s just business.”293 Another interviewee explained, “The
camp policies have tightened up, by that I mean that the exchange
between the guards and refugees is like this: ‘It’s more difficult to
leave this month. How much more difficult? About 200 baht more

288. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
289. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
290. Interview with UNHCR officer, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center]
291. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
292. Id.
293. Id.
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difficult.’”294 A third interviewee from another camp simply reported
that, “since 2012, it has become more difficult for the refugees to
move around without a camp pass. Normally, they could sneak out of
the camps, but right now they cannot.”295 NGOs have reported that,
where before there were unofficial openings, now fences are also
physically closed off.296
Regardless of whether a refugee is given official permission to
leave the camp for a temporary period, refugees are not technically
allowed to work outside the camps, despite some pressure from
NGOs and UNHCR to allow them to do so. Though many do actually
secretly work outside the camps, the Thai government refuses to
acknowledge that this takes place.297 Refugees caught outside the
camps are subject to arrest, and many interviewees described such
arrests happening to them or to others that they know.298 Some
refugees have suggested that the rules are stricter now, “[m]aybe
because MOI wants to restore order, maybe because it gets
complaints from locals, or maybe because of bigger changes between
Thailand and Burma.”299
B. Thai Policies Allowing Limited Movement
There seems to be some variance in how movements outside of
camps are regulated. Aside from camp passes, the situations that seem
the most advantageous for refugees are those where unofficial
movement seems to be relatively tolerated. For example, in one camp
an NGO staff worker reported, “There is a new policy that not more
than 100 can leave per day. It is all unofficial. The camp doesn’t want
to make a record, because if someone higher up sees the record, they

294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
297. Interview with UNHCR officer, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center]
298. Id.; see also Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on
file with Leitner Center] (“It depends on the camp committee and Thai authorities whether
someone can get in the camp. Sometimes we are allowed out if we have documents. Those
who don’t have documents can go unofficially, but they will be arrested if they are caught
outside.”).
299. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
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might get in trouble.”300 Another account reflected similar
information:
Since the coup, checkpoints have been put in place for anyone
going in and out, but because there are no fences, people can still
leave. The military wanted to set up proper checkpoints that
monitor how many people leave and how many people return.
District officers avoided this by guaranteeing that they can
control the crowds and set a quota of 100 people.301

In some of these cases, camp committees collect monthly data on who
leaves or enters the camps.302 If a person leaves the camp for a day,
they are included in those numbers. Only those who leave the camps
for a month or two are excluded.303 One camp committee noted, for
example, that each month only about thirty refugees leave and thirty
enter.304
Rules do vary to some degree from camp to camp. Depending on
how isolated the camp is from populated areas, in some cases,
authorities will allow camp residents to leave the camp as long as they
stay within a certain proximity of camp boundaries. For example,
when a refugee living in an isolated camp in the north of Thailand
was asked whether refugees were allowed to leave the camp, he
replied:
Yes, to supplement their rations. They don’t go far and almost
always to work with local Thais. There is an understanding with
the Thai authorities about this, but refugees are also limited by
the geography; they can’t go very far because of all the
mountains around here. Thai authorities are not a problem close
to the camp, but if we go farther than five villages away it
becomes a problem. We avoid the official camp gates.305

Another refugee likewise reported:
People can’t go far, but we can do local farm labor. The Thai
authorities are flexible, as long as everyone doesn’t try to do it.
Stay in small groups. Also, NGOs provide some farmable land
300. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Interview with refugee camp committee member, in Thailand (May 2015)
[Interview record on file with Leitner Center].
305. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
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just outside the camp . . . . [But] one day roundtrip—farther is not
allowed.306

In some cases, it works differently, even with different Thai
authorities within the same camp. As one refugee said:
Sometimes we just go through the checkpoint, no questions
asked. Or, if there are questions, we just tell them the truth—that
we’re going out to work on a farm. NGOs have explained to the
guards and set up a relationship with them so that they
understand the project.307

Another NGO worker explained:
Although the rule is that they are not allowed to work outside the
camp, there is an understanding that they work in Mae Sot. There
is usually some negotiation process with the Thai authorities or
the camp commander—for example, for humanitarian reasons.308

In other cases, refugees might be arrested, but will be released shortly
thereafter without further penalty. For example, a refugee from
another remote camp explained:
Our camp is far from the towns and because most people around
here are Karen Thai, we rarely have any issues. Refugees
however might get arrested in Mae Sariang. There is an
understanding between Thai authorities and refugees, but if
arrested they are locked up in detention centers for a few days
and then released to the camps.309

C. Penalties for Being Caught Leaving the Camps
However, these unofficial understandings are the exception rather
than the rule. Many refugees noted that camp residents who wish to
leave the camps for work or other purposes are forced to use points of
entry and egress that are not monitored by camp authorities. For
example, one resident reported, “I know of three [roads that go in and
out of the camps], but there could be more. Local authorities are
aware of some of these back roads. They just don’t do anything to

306. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
307. Id.
308. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
309. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
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monitor them.”310 Another told us, “If people go to look for work,
they use the short cut in and out of the camp.”311 Using these “secret”
shortcuts comes with risks. As one refugee described, “[S]ometimes
the Thai authorities will conduct spot checks. Military, MOI, police,
and immigration authorities make surprise stops at shortcut entrances
and arrest refugees.”312 Refugees are aware that there can be serious
consequences for sneaking out of the camps. One interviewee
explained:
If a refugee gets caught outside the camp, sometimes they are
simply forced to pay a bribe at the checkpoint of 50-200 baht,
and if they can’t pay, they are then arrested or detained. Refugees
know this and won’t leave if they don’t have the money to pay
the bribes.313

One refugee added, “If you come out of the camp, you become
illegal. You can be arrested at any time. Once, the police came to the
camp rear entrance and just made arrests . . . .”314
UNHCR has also confirmed that there have been arrests for
people trying to go out to work.315 One refugee interviewee described
a typical encounter:
I went out of the camp, and the police didn’t see me on my way
out. I was going to the city center. I walked for three to four days.
Then I got sick and I wanted to go back. But the police set up a
checkpoint, and I was arrested on the way back to the camp. I
didn’t have my ID. I was detained for one day. I paid some
money (3,500 baht), and then I was released.316

Another interviewee reported that, if detained, refugees would be
required to pay a fine of 1,000 baht at a detention center or 2,500 baht
at the immigration office.317
When a refugee is arrested for being caught outside the camp
perimeter, refugee committees oftentimes try to work with Thai
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. (“If you go by the main road, the police will catch you but you can go through
the back secretly.”).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Interview with UNHCR officer, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
316. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
317. Id.
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authorities to secure the release and return of the refugee to the camp.
As one Committee Secretary described:
KNRC works with the Thai authorities. If [the camp resident]
was only going to the village, it’s usually okay—here there is an
understanding with the Thai authorities. But if the refugee is
going beyond Nai Soi, then it is unsure what will happen. Also,
sometimes the Thai authorities pick up refugees, drive beyond
the boundaries, and then arrest them there. The fine is between
2,000 and 4,000 baht, and they can spend up to thirty days in
jail.318

Once fines are paid and the refugee is released from jail, he/she can
typically return to the camp.319 However, the refugee may also be
deported; this happened more frequently before camp refugee
committees began negotiating with Thai authorities to let jailed
refugees return to the camp.320 Often, if refugees are deported, they
take advantage of the next opportunity to sneak back to the camps
across the border. As one interviewee described:
One time I got sent back to Burma, but I just came back. I swam
across the river. It’s easy [to swim], but there are police there. I
was put in jail for two days. The jail was difficult. It was like
living in a toilet because it was so small.321

D. Local Thai Attitudes
While Thai authorities may restrict movement in part to address
Thai political concerns regarding protection of the domestic labor
market, in reality, reactions of local Thai populations to Burmese
refugees may be more nuanced. In general, popular attitudes in
Thailand about refugees can be negative, often fueled by political
rhetoric and media reports that can disproportionately highlight
crimes linked to individuals from urban refugee communities, but
Thai communities living in more rural areas near refugee camps may
not react to refugees in the same way, and may sometimes even find

318. Interview with refugee committee member, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview
record on file with Leitner Center].
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
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value in an alternative labor market.322 For example, as one
community member noted:
During the rainy season, the farmers start to plant. The refugees
come out from the camps and help Thai farmers and earn daily
wages. During the harvest season, it is the same. The refugees
don’t have money for their families, so they go out to look for
work. Thais pay less [labor costs] for refugees than for other
[local] Thai [workers], so the farmers want to [employ] more
refugees.323

When asked whether Thai people in the communities around the
camps are receptive or welcoming to refugees, we were told that
“they don’t really like them, but they also want them as workers.”324
But some refugees have reported that they do not feel welcome
in the local community and that sometimes interactions with the Thai
community can have negative consequences. One camp resident
explained that, “Thai villagers complain that refugees are stealing and
causing trouble” and “refugees get targeted by the locals.”325 An NGO
worker further commented:
[The crackdown on movement and the work] is about a need for
control on the part of the Thai government. It’s also a cultural
and political play. Thai society views migrants and refugees as a
threat to jobs and are thus not welcoming to the refugees.326

Refugees attempt to leave the camp because they are unable to
secure enough resources within the camp, especially as donor funded
rations and supplies decrease. As one refugee described, “In the
camp, supplies and schooling comes from [NGOs]. [Refugees] are
dependent on [these NGO services]. There is not enough in the
camps, so some people leave the camps to find jobs.”327
An NGO worker also explained how this situation has become
untenable:
322. See supra Section II.a.2, Treatment of Refugee Status in Thailand
323. Interview with Thai citizen living nearby refugee camp, in Thailand (May 2015)
[Interview record on file with Leitner Center].
324. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
325. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
326. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
327. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with
Leitner Center].
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Since the coup, movement in and out of the camps has been
restricted. This has impacted the economy inside the camps,
especially because refugees now need to supplement their daily
income, food and resources outside. Previously, each family got
ten to twelve kilos of rice per month, but it has now been reduced
to eight kilos per month. Refugees are now unable to access the
economy outside the camps. After the coup, the dependency on
rations increased at a time when the rations [were] decreasing the
most. An informal economy was necessary after the reduction in
rations. When the coup happened, they really had to depend on
the rations more, just as they were being cut.328

Restrictions on movement and the right to work can be especially
difficult for younger camp residents. A service provider reported,
“The younger generation …are [feeling] hopeless because they are
stuck in camps and cannot work. They can see through technology
that the world has more to offer than what they have.”329
But for both young and old, restrictions on movement have
essentially turned these camps into de facto detention centers. As one
NGO framed it, it’s as simple as: “[c]amp residents used to also be
able to walk outside; now, they cannot.”330
III. APPLICATION OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LEGAL PROTECTIONS TO BURMESE REFUGEES
LIVING IN THAILAND
While Thailand is not a party331 to the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”)332 and its 1967

328. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
329. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center]. (When asked what are some of the challenges that refugees are facing
right now, interviewee replied, “Dealing with restrictions on our movement, the young people
in the camps don’t know what to do with their education. They also don’t understand the
importance of education.”).
330. Interview with NGO staff person, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file
with Leitner Center].
331. See Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties, UNOHCHR,
http://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Sep. 21, 2015).
332. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S 137.
[hereinafter Refugee Convention]
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Optional Protocol,333 the rights of refugees living in Thailand are still
protected by the many international human rights treaties to which
Thailand is a State party.334 Critically, these treaties protect the rights
of everyone living in the jurisdiction, not just the citizens of the State
party. For refugees living in Thailand, these rights include the right to
food, housing, health care, and education; freedom of movement; the
right to work; and protection from refoulement.
a. Right to an Adequate Standard of Living (Food & Shelter), Health
Care, & Education
1. Characterization of Rights to Adequate Standard of Living (Food &
Shelter), Health Care, & Education
The right to an adequate standard of living (including food and
shelter), health care, education, and other socio-economic rights are
chiefly protected in the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), to which Thailand is a State
party.335 These rights are also protected in a similar manner in three
other derivative core human rights conventions to which Thailand is a
State party: the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”),336 the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(“CEDAW”),337 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(“CRC”).338 In particular, as applies to all refugees living within
Thailand’s jurisdiction, ICESCR Articles 11, 12, and 13 protect the
rights to an adequate standard of living, access to health care, and
education, respectively.339
333. Optional Protocol to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4,
1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
334. See infra Part III.
335. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, 12, 13,
and generally, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
336. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 5, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
337. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, art. 10-14, 18 Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
338. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 20-32, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
339. ICESCR, supra note 335, art. 11, 12, &13.
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A. Food
ICESCR Article 11 mandates:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his
family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the
continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right,
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international
co-operation based on free consent.340

The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(“CESCR”), the treaty body mechanism for the ICESCR, has
affirmed:
[T]he right to adequate food is indivisibly linked to the inherent
dignity of the human person and is indispensable for the
fulfilment of other human rights enshrined in the International
Bill of Human Rights[; the right to adequate food] is also
inseparable from social justice, requiring the adoption of
appropriate economic, environmental and social policies, at both
the national and international levels, oriented to the eradication of
poverty and the fulfilment of all human rights for all.341

The Committee considers that the core content of the right to
adequate food implies the availability of food in a quantity and
quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, and that
the accessibility of such food is secured in ways that are sustainable
and that do not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights.342
Dietary needs means that the diet as a whole contains a mix of
nutrients for physical and mental growth, development and
maintenance, and physical activity that are in compliance with human
physiological needs.343 At a minimum, “every State is obliged to
ensure for everyone under its jurisdiction access to the minimum
essential food which is sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe, to
ensure their freedom from hunger.”344 Furthermore, accessibility
encompasses both economic and physical accessibility: “Economic
accessibility applies to any acquisition pattern or entitlement through
340. Id., art. 11..
341. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, ¶ 4, Gen.
Comment 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999).
342. Id. ¶ 8.
343. Id. ¶ 9.
344. Id. ¶ 14.
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which people procure their food and is a measure of the extent to
which it is satisfactory for the enjoyment of the right to adequate
food.”345 The Committee also notes that socially vulnerable groups,
specially disadvantaged groups, and particularly impoverished
segments of the population may need attention through special
programs.346
Per ICESCR Article 11, Thailand has an obligation under
international law to protect and take appropriate steps to ensure the
realization of the rights for everyone within its jurisdiction to an
adequate standard of living.347 As a component of this obligation,
Thailand must provide or allow access to food within the refugee
camps in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs
of camp residents.348 The diet of camp residents must as a whole
contains a mix of nutrients for physical and mental growth,
development and maintenance, and physical activity that are in
compliance with human physiological needs.349 At a minimum,
Thailand must provide access to an amount and type of food which is
sufficient, nutritionally adequate, and safe to ensure freedom from
hunger—even if this means Thailand is required to implement special
programs to accommodate these vulnerable refugee populations.350 In
contrast to fulfilling these obligations, in 2015, refugees were
receiving only ten kilograms of rice per month—amounting to no
more than a standard per person allotment of 1505 kilocalories per
day—which is 39.5 percent below the minimum international
standard.351 As rations continue to decline, Thailand is neither
supplementing additional food supplies, nor actively working with
donor countries to increase funding to meet basic nutrition
standards.352

345. Id. ¶ 13.
346. Id.
347. ICESCR, supra note 335, art. 11.
348. Id. ¶ 8.
349. Id. ¶ 9.
350. Id. ¶ 14.
351. See TBC JANUARY–JUNE 2015 PROGRAMME REPORT, supra note 200, at 25.
352. See supra Section II.b.1.A, Food.
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B. Shelter
In terms of shelter, the Committee has stated that “the human
right to adequate housing, which is thus derived from the right to an
adequate standard of living, is [also] of central importance for the
enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights.”353
The Committee also notes:
The right to housing should not be interpreted in a narrow or
restrictive sense which equates it with, for example, the shelter
provided by merely having a roof over one’s head . . . . Rather it
should be seen as the right to live somewhere in security, peace
and dignity. This is appropriate for at least two reasons. In the
first place, the right to housing is integrally linked to other human
rights and to the fundamental principles upon which the
Covenant is premised. This “the inherent dignity of the human
person” from which the rights in the Covenant are said to derive
requires that the term “housing” be interpreted so as to take
account of a variety of other considerations, most importantly
that the right to housing should be ensured to all persons
irrespective of income or access to economic resources.
Secondly, the reference in article 11 (1) must be read as referring
not just to housing but to adequate housing. As both the
Commission on Human Settlements and the Global Strategy for
Shelter to the Year 2000 have stated: “Adequate shelter means ...
adequate privacy, adequate space, adequate security, adequate
lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and
adequate location with regard to work and basic facilities - all at
a reasonable cost.”354

The Committee has highlighted habitability, as well as availability of
services, materials, facilities, and infrastructure as key concepts in the
evaluation of housing’s adequacy.355 In one Comment, the Committee
noted, “Adequate housing must be habitable, in terms of providing the
inhabitants with adequate space and protecting them from cold, damp,
heat, rain, wind or other threats to health, structural hazards, and
disease vectors.”356 The Committee has gone on to stipulate that
“[t]he physical safety of occupants must be guaranteed as well,”
especially considering “inadequate and deficient housing and living
353. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Housing, ¶ 1, Gen.
Comment 4, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991).
354. Id. ¶ 7.
355. Id. ¶ 8.
356. Id.
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conditions are invariably associated with higher mortality and
morbidity rates.”357 Additionally, “an adequate house must contain
certain facilities essential for health, security, comfort and
nutrition.”358 Finally, the Committee has stated:
All beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing should have
sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe
drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting,
sanitation and washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse
disposal, site drainage and emergency services.359

Per ICESCR Article 11, Thailand must also provide camp
residents with appropriate materials for shelter.360 Providing shelter
means more than simply supplying a roof; rather, Thailand is
obligated to ensure that camp residents are able to live somewhere in
security, peace, and dignity. 361 Accommodations must be habitable—
meaning refugees must be able to access appropriate services,
materials, facilities, and infrastructure.362 To be habitable, camp
housing must provide adequate space and protection from cold, damp,
heat, rain, wind, and other threats to health, structural hazards, and
disease vectors.363 Refugees must also have sustainable access to
natural and common resources, safe drinking water, energy for
cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, means
of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency
services.364 In contrast, Thailand will not allow camp residents to
build shelters with more durable materials such as corrugated steel,
but will only permit use of impermanent materials such as bamboo
and leaf thatching.365 As available materials decline, authorities will
also not allow refugees access to areas outside of camp to collect
natural resources for building and repairs, possibly rendering these
shelters neither safe not habitable.366
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Housing, Gen.
Comment 4, supra note 353, ¶ 1.
361. Id. ¶ 7.
362. Id. ¶ 8.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. See supra Section II.b.1.B, Shelter.
366. Id.
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C. Health Care
ICESCR Article 12 mandates:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health. The steps to be taken by the States
Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of
this right shall include those necessary for . . . [t]he provision for
the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for
the healthy development of the child; . . . [t]he prevention,
treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, . . . and other
diseases; [and t]he creation of conditions which would assure to
all medical service and medical attention in the event of
sickness.367

The Committee notes that “[h]ealth is a fundamental human right
indispensable for the exercise of other human rights [and that e]very
human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of health conducive to living a life in dignity.”368 “The
entitlements [protected by the Covenant] include the right to a system
of health protection which provides equality of opportunity for people
to enjoy the highest attainable level of health,”369 and “the right to
health must be understood as a right to the enjoyment of a variety of
facilities, goods, services, and conditions necessary for the realization
of the highest attainable standard of health.”370
The Committee has also stated that the “[f]unctioning public
health and healthcare facilities, goods and services, as well as
programs, have to be available in sufficient quantity within the State
party, and they have to be physically accessible.”371 In terms of
accessibility, relevant “health facilities, goods, and services must be
within safe physical reach for all sections of the population, especially
vulnerable or marginalized groups.”372 Furthermore:
[A]s well as being culturally acceptable, health facilities, goods,
and services must also be scientifically and medically appropriate

367. ICESCR, supra note 335, art. 12.
368. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health, ¶ 1, Gen. Comment 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
369. Id. ¶ 8.
370. Id. ¶ .9.
371. Id. ¶ 12 (citing World Health Organization, Model List of Essential Drugs (Dec.
1999)).
372. Id.
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and of good quality; this requires skilled medical personnel,
scientifically approved and unexpired drugs and hospital
equipment, safe and potable water, and adequate sanitation.373

Thus:
[t]he Committee mandates that the creation of conditions which
would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the
event of sickness, both physical and mental, includes the
provision of equal and timely access to basic preventive,
curative, rehabilitative health services, and health education;
regular screening programs; appropriate treatment of prevalent
diseases, illnesses, injuries, and disabilities, preferably at
community level; the provision of essential drugs; and
appropriate mental health treatment and care.374

Specifically, the Committee points out that the associated “right to
treatment includes the creation of a system of urgent medical care in
cases of accidents, epidemics, and similar health hazards, and the
provision of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in emergency
situations.”375 In its comment, the Committee states:
In particular, States are under the obligation to respect the right
to health by, inter alia, refraining from denying or limiting equal
access for all persons, including prisoners or detainees,
minorities, asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants, to preventive,
curative and palliative health services; abstaining from enforcing
discriminatory practices as a State policy . . . .376

Per ICESCR Article 12, Thailand must protect and take
appropriate steps to ensure the right of refugees living within its
jurisdiction to access adequate health care services.377 This right
includes enjoyment of a variety of facilities, goods, services, and
conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable
standard of health.378 Camp residents must have access to a sufficient
number of functioning health care facilities and practitioners.379
Facilities must be within safe physical reach for all sections of the
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
1999)).

Id.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 34.
ICSECR, supra note 335, art. 12.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 12 (citing World Health Organization, Model List of Essential Drugs (Dec.
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refugee population—either appropriate facilities within the camps
themselves, or unfettered access to facilities in close proximity to the
camps.380 Health facilities, goods, and services for refugees must also
be scientifically and medically appropriate and of good quality; this
requires skilled medical personnel, scientifically approved and
unexpired drugs and hospital equipment, safe and potable water, and
adequate sanitation.381 Refugees must also have equal and timely
access to basic preventive, curative, rehabilitative health services, and
health education; regular screening programs; appropriate treatment
of prevalent diseases, illnesses, injuries, and disabilities; the provision
of essential drugs; and appropriate mental health treatment and
care.382 In particular, Thailand is required to provide access to these
services to refugees as part of its obligations to provide disaster relief
and humanitarian assistance in emergency situations.383 Thailand is
under the obligation to respect the right to health by refraining from
denying or limiting equal access for all persons, including prisoners
or detainees, minorities, asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants, to
preventive, curative and palliative health services and by abstaining
from enforcing discriminatory practices as a state policy.384 In
contrast, as health services provided by NGOs continue to decline due
to funding shortages, Thailand is not supplying additional services or
allowing refugees to access public resources outside the camps unless
a medical emergency exists; nor is Thailand actively working with
donor countries to increase funding to meet basic health standards;
build new facilities within camps; or ensure that existing services are
available, accessible, and of an appropriate quality.385
D. Education
ICESCR Article 13 mandates:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to education. They agree that education shall be
directed to the full development of the human personality and the
sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. ¶ 17.
383. Id. ¶ 16.
384. Id. ¶ 34.
385. See supra Section II.b.1.C, Health Care.
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rights and fundamental freedoms. . . . The States Parties to the
present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full
realization of this right [that p]rimary education shall be
compulsory and available free to all [and s]econdary education in
its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary
education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all
by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive
introduction of free education.386

As the Committee describes:
Education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable
means of realizing other human rights. As an empowerment
right, education is the primary vehicle by which economically
and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves
out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their
communities. Education has a vital role in empowering women,
safeguarding children from exploitative and hazardous labour
and sexual exploitation, promoting human rights and democracy,
protecting the environment, and controlling population growth.
Increasingly, education is recognized as one of the best financial
investments States can make. But the importance of education is
not just practical: a well-educated, enlightened and active mind,
able to wander freely and widely, is one of the joys and rewards
of human existence.387

The Committee has explicitly stated that functioning educational
institutions and programs have to be available in sufficient quantity
and have to be accessible to everyone, without discrimination.388 In
terms of physical accessibility, “education has to be within safe
physical reach.”389 In terms of economic accessibility, education in
general has to be affordable to all, and primary education specifically
must be free for all.390 Finally, the form and substance of education,
including curricula, and teaching methods, must also be of an
acceptable quality.391

386. ICESCR, supra note 335, art. 13.
387. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., The Right to Education, ¶ 1, Gen.
Comment 13, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999).
388. Id. ¶ 6.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
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Per ICESCR Article 13, Thailand must also protect and take
appropriate steps to ensure the right of refugees living within its
jurisdiction to access adequate education services.392 Camp residents
must have access to a sufficient number of functioning educational
facilities and educators.393 Schools must be within safe physical reach
for all sections of the refugee population—either appropriate facilities
within the camps themselves, or unfettered access to facilities in close
proximity to the camps. 394 In terms of economic accessibility,
education in general has to be affordable, and primary education
specifically must be free for all refugee children.395 The form and
substance of education in the camps, including curricula, and teaching
methods, must also be of an acceptable quality.396 In contrast, as
educational services provided by NGOs continue to decline due to
funding shortages, refugee educational needs must be met with fewer
schools and fewer and less qualified teachers.397 Families of students,
including primary students, are now often required to pay school
fees.398 Thailand is not supplying additional services or allowing
refugees to access public schools outside the camps; nor is Thailand
actively working with donor countries to increase funding to meet
basic education standards; build new facilities within camps; or
ensure that existing services are available, accessible and of an
appropriate quality.399
2. ICESCR Framework Underpinning Rights to Adequate Standard of
Living (Food & Shelter), Health Care, & Education

A. Respect, Protect, Fulfill
The right to an adequate standard of living—including food and
shelter, as well as the rights to access to health care and education—
impose three types or levels of obligations on State parties: the
392. ICESCR, supra note 335, art. 13.
393. Id. ¶ 6.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See supra Section II.b.1.D, Education.
398. Id.
399. Id.
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obligations to respect, to protect, and to fulfill.400 In turn, the
obligation to fulfill incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an
obligation to provide.401 The obligation to respect existing access to
adequate food [shelter, health care, and educational services] requires
States parties not to take any measures that result in preventing such
access.402 The obligation to protect requires measures by the State to
ensure that enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of
their access.403 The obligation to fulfill (facilitate) means the State
must proactively engage in activities intended to strengthen people’s
access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure the
protection of these rights.404 As the Committee has stated,
“[W]henever an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond
their control, to enjoy these rights to adequate food [shelter, health
care, and education] by the means at their disposal, States have the
obligation to fulfill (provide) that right directly.”405 The Committee
has also noted:
The obligation to fulfill (facilitate) requires States . . . to take
positive measures that enable and assist individuals and
communities to enjoy…[their] right[s]…. States parties are also
obliged to fulfill (provide) a specific right contained in the
Covenant when individuals or a group are unable, for reasons
beyond their control, to realize that right themselves by the
means at their disposal.406

The Committee particularly emphasizes, especially in relation to
securing appropriate food resources, that “[t]his obligation also
applies for persons who are victims of natural or other disasters.”407
These obligations include providing nutritiously safe food and potable
400. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen.
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 15; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to
Education, Gen. Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶¶ 46-47; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural
Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note
368, ¶¶ 33-37.
401. See supra note 400.
402. See id.
403. See id.
404. See id.
405. See id.
406. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 37; see also Comm. on Econ., Soc.,
and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen. Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 15;
Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Education, Gen. Comment 13, supra
note 387, ¶¶ 46-47.
407. See supra note 406.
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drinking water, ensuring basic sanitation and adequate housing and
living conditions, providing “a sufficient number of hospitals, clinics
and other health-related facilities,” and “actively developing a system
of schools, including building classrooms, delivering suitable
programming, providing teaching materials, training teachers, and
paying teachers them domestically competitive salaries.”408
The right to an adequate standard of living—including food
and shelter, as well as the rights to access to health care and
education, impose these three types or levels of obligations on
Thailand regarding refugees within its jurisdiction.409 In particular,
Thailand’s obligation to fulfill incorporates both an obligation to
facilitate and an obligation to provide.410 The obligation to facilitate
requires that Thailand proactively engage in activities intended to
strengthen refugee access to and utilization of resources and means to
ensure the protection of these fundamental rights.411 The obligation to
provide requires that, whenever an individual or group is unable for
reasons beyond their control to enjoy these rights by the means at
their disposal, Thailand has the obligation to provide that right
directly.412 Especially in relation to securing appropriate food
resources, Thailand’s obligation extends to particularly vulnerable
populations, including populations such as refugees who are victims
of emergency disasters.413 These obligations include providing
nutritiously safe food and potable drinking water; ensuring basic
sanitation and adequate housing and living conditions; providing a
sufficient number of hospitals, clinics and other health-related
facilities; and actively developing a system of schools, including
building classrooms, delivering suitable programming, providing
teaching materials, training teachers, and paying teachers them

408. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Education, Gen.
Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶ 50; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 36.
409. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen.
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 15; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to
Education, Gen. Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶¶ 46-47; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural
Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note
368, ¶¶ 33-37.
410. See id.
411. See id.
412. See id.
413. See id.
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domestically competitive salaries.414 Not only has Thailand not met
its obligations under international human rights law to fulfill these
rights. Perhaps even more egregiously, Thailand has also failed to
respect and protect existing access to adequate food [shelter, health
care, and educational services] by taking measures such as restricting
egress from the camps and by denying refugees the right to work that
directly result in preventing such access.415
B. How Violations Occur: Commission or Omission
Violations of these rights can occur through acts of
commission—the direct action of States or other entities insufficiently
regulated by States—or by acts of omission—the failure of a State to
take steps required by the Covenant.416 Examples of violations
include adoption of legislation or policies that are manifestly
incompatible with pre-existing legal obligations relating to protected
rights; the prevention of access to humanitarian aid—particularly food
aid—in internal conflicts or other emergency situations; failure to
take measures that address de facto discrimination; denial of access to
particular resources or services necessary to secure the right for
individuals or groups, whether the discrimination is based on
legislation or is proactive; and the failure of a State to take into
account its international legal obligations regarding protected rights
when entering into agreements with other States or with international
organizations.417
Thailand is violating the rights of these refugees under
international human rights law by both its inaction (acts of omission)
414. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Education, Gen.
Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶ 50; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 36.
415. See supra note 404.
416. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen.
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 19; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to
Education, Gen. Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶ 59; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts.,
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶¶
48-52.
417. See supra note 416. Other notable examples of violations include formal repeal or
suspension of legislation necessary for the continued enjoyment of a right and failure to
regulate activities of individuals or groups so as to prevent them from violating the protected
rights of others.
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and by direct actions (acts of commission).418 First, as resources to the
camps provided by outside funders decline, Thailand is not filling
those resource gaps to meet its international obligations under the
ICESCR.419 Second, in addition to this inaction, Thailand is also
directly enforcing policies such as restrictions on the freedom of
movement and the right to work.420 These direct actions [strategically]
prevent refugees from accessing necessary foodstuffs, supplies, and
services necessary for securing their rights to food, shelter, health
care, and education—violations which include adoption of legislation
or policies that are manifestly incompatible with pre-existing legal
obligations relating to protected rights; the prevention of access to
humanitarian aid, particularly food aid, in internal conflicts or other
emergency situations; and denial of access to particular resources or
services necessary to secure these rights.421
C. Minimum Core & No Retrogressive Measures or Discrimination
In General Comment 3, the Committee confirms that States
Parties have a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights enunciated in the
Covenant. In the Committee’s view:
[T]hese core obligations include at least the following
obligations:
(a) To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods
and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for
vulnerable or marginalized groups;
(b) To ensure access to the minimum essential food which
is nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from
hunger to everyone;
(c) To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and
sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe and potable
water;
418. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen.
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 19; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to
Education, Gen. Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶ 59; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts.,
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶¶
48-52.
419. See supra Section II.B.1, Access to Necessary Resources & Services
420. See supra Section II.B.2, Ability to Move Freely & Work.
421. See supra note 416.
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(d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined
under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs;
(e) To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities,
goods and services.422

The Committee also states that, “[s]hould a State party argue that
resource constraints make it impossible to provide access to food,
shelter, health care, or educational services for those who are unable
by themselves to secure such access, the State has to demonstrate that
every effort has been made to use all the resources at its disposal in an
effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum
obligations.”423 The Committee also adds:
This follows from article 2.1 of the Covenant, which obliges a
State party to take the necessary steps to the maximum of its
available resources. . . . A State claiming that it is unable to carry
out its obligation for reasons beyond its control therefore has the
burden of proving that this is the case and that it has
unsuccessfully sought to obtain international support to ensure
the availability and accessibility of the necessary [resource].424

The Committee also confirms that “[a] State party cannot, under any
circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with [these]
core obligations, which are non-derogable.”425 Most especially, even
under severe resource constraints, the right to adequate food must be
fulfilled. 426 As the Committee mandates:
Even where a State faces severe resource constraints, whether
caused by a process of economic adjustment, economic
recession, climatic conditions or other factors, measures should
be undertaken to ensure that the right to adequate food is
422. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations,
¶ 10, Gen. Comment 3, E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990); Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts.,
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶
43 (citing International Conference on Population and Development, Report, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1, Ch. I, Resol. 1 (Sept. 5-13, 1994)) (“Read in conjunction with more
contemporary instruments, such as the Programme of Action of the International Conference
on Population and Development, the Alma-Ata Declaration provides compelling guidance on
the core obligations arising from article 12.”).
423. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen.
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 17.
424. Id.
425. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 47.
426. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen.
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 28.
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especially fulfilled for vulnerable population groups and
individuals.427

Furthermore, “as with all other rights in the Covenant, there is a
strong presumption that retrogressive measures taken in relation to the
right to [food, shelter, health, and education] are not permissible.”428
As the Committee states:
If any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the State
party has the burden of proving that they have been introduced
after the most careful consideration of all alternatives and that
they are duly justified by reference to the totality of the rights
provided for in the Covenant in the context of the full use of the
State party’s maximum available resources.429

Finally, per the prohibition contained in ICESCR Article 2, any
discrimination in access to food, shelter, health care, and educational
services—as well as to means and entitlements for its procurement—
on the grounds of race, color, sex, language, age, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status
with the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal
enjoyment or exercise of economic, social, and cultural rights,
constitutes a violation of the Covenant.430 While the Covenant
provides for progressive realization and acknowledges the constraints
due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes on State
parties various obligations that are of immediate effect. The
Committee specifically points out that, even in times of severe
resource constraints, the vulnerable members of society must be
protected.431 State parties have immediate obligations in relation to
the protection of these rights, such as the “guarantee” that the right
“will be exercised without discrimination of any kind.”432 The
427. Id.
428. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 32 (referencing General Comment 3,
¶ 9 and General Comment 13, ¶ 45).
429. Id.
430. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen.
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶¶ 6, 18; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to
Education, Gen. Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶¶ 43-45; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural
Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note
368, ¶¶ 12, 18-19.
431. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Nature of States Parties' Obligations,
Gen. Comment 3, supra note 422, ¶ 12.
432. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen.
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 30.
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prohibition against discrimination enshrined in Article 2(2) of
Covenant is subject to neither progressive realization nor
availability of resources; it applies fully and immediately to
aspects of the protection of the right and encompasses
internationally prohibited grounds of discrimination.433
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the
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CESCR has made clear that State parties have a core obligation to
ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels
of each of the rights enunciated in the Covenant for everyone within
its jurisdiction.434 In terms of Thailand’s positive core obligations, at
least the following rights for refugees and asylum seekers living
within its borders must be protected:


Access in the camps to the minimum essential food that
is nutritionally adequate, safe, and ensures freedom from
hunger



Access in the camps to basic shelter, housing, sanitation,
and an adequate supply of safe and potable water



Access for refugees to adequate health facilities, goods,
and services



Access of refugees to appropriate educational facilities
and educators—as well as free primary education435

Furthermore, Thailand cannot argue that resource constraints make it
impossible to provide access to food, shelter, health care, or
educational services for those who are unable by themselves to secure
such access without first demonstrating that every effort has been
made to use all the resources at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as a
matter of priority, those minimum obligations.436 These core
obligations are non-derogable—especially the right to adequate
433. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, The Right to Education, Gen.
Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶¶ 43-45.
434. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Nature of States Parties’
Obligations, Gen. Comment 3, supra note 422, ¶ 10; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts.,
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶
43 (citing International Conference on Population and Development, Report, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1, Ch. I, Resol. 1 (Sept. 5-13, 1994)) (“Read in conjunction with more
contemporary instruments, such as the Programme of Action of the International Conference
on Population and Development, the Alma-Ata Declaration provides compelling guidance on
the core obligations arising from article 12.”).
435. See supra note 344.
436. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen.
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 17.
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food.437 Furthermore, CESCR’s interpretation of the Covenant
includes a strong presumption that retrogressive measures taken in
relation to these rights are not permissible.438 While Thailand never
itself funded the supply of food, goods, and services within these
camps, with the decline in resource provision, Thailand has
deliberately begun to enforce policies that cement refugees’ inability
to secure appropriate resources to fulfill their rights. With the
enactment of these deliberately retrogressive measures, Thailand has
the burden of proving that they have been introduced after the most
careful consideration of all alternatives and that they are duly justified
by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant
in the context of the full use of Thailand’s maximum available
resources.439 Finally, per the prohibition contained in ICESCR Article
2, any discrimination in access to food, shelter, health care, and
educational services—as well as to means and entitlements for its
procurement—on the grounds of race, color, sex, language, age,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status with the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the equal enjoyment or exercise of economic, social, and
cultural rights, constitutes a violation of the Covenant.440 Thailand is
clearly discriminating against this population due to their refugee
status. While the Covenant provides for progressive realization and
acknowledges the constraints due to the limits of available resources,
it also imposes on State parties various obligations that are of
immediate effect, in particular the prohibition against discrimination
and the protection of vulnerable populations.441

437. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 28 & 47.
438. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 32 (referencing General Comment 3,
¶ 9 and General Comment 13, ¶ 45).
439. Id.
440. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen.
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶¶ 6, 18; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to
Education, Gen. Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶¶ 43-45; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural
Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note
368, ¶¶ 12, 18-19.
441. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations,
Gen. Comment 3, supra note 422, ¶ 12.
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D. National Strategy & International Cooperation
A State should have a margin of discretion in designing its own
strategy to assure the guarantee of these fundamental rights, but the
Covenant clearly mandates that each State party “take whatever steps
are necessary to ensure that these rights to food, shelter, health care,
and education are protected.”442 This requires some adoption of a
national strategy, based on human rights principles, and “the
formulation of policies and corresponding benchmarks—including the
identification of the resources available to meet the objectives and the
most cost-effective way of using them.”443 The Committee
specifically notes that appropriate institutional mechanisms should be
devised to secure a representative process towards the formulation of
a strategy which draws on all available relevant domestic expertise,
sets out the responsibilities and time-frame for the implementation of
the necessary measures, and addresses intersectionality with other
rights protections.444
This does not mean that it is up to the host state alone to fund or
resource refugees in its jurisdiction. However, State parties must
make efforts to facilitate the provision of resources through
collaboration with other donor States, NGOs and civil society; even
though it is States that are the legal parties to the Covenant, and are
thus ultimately accountable for compliance with its provisions within
their own jurisdiction, all members of society— including individuals,
families, local communities, non-governmental organizations, as well
as the private business sector and other donor States—can
beneficially contribute to the process of the realization of the rights to
adequate food and shelter, health care, and education. So, as the
Committee notes, States “should provide an environment that
facilitates implementation of services by these civil society actors.”445
The Committee has also noted, in terms of the reciprocal
obligation of donor countries, most of which do not bear the burden
of hosting large numbers of the world’s refugees, that these “States
parties should recognize the essential role of international cooperation
442. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, The Right to Adequate Food,
Gen. Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 21.
443. Id.
444. Id. ¶¶ 24-25; see also Comm. on Econ., Social and Cultural Rights, The Right to
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 53.
445. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, The Right to Adequate Food,
Gen. Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 20.
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and comply with their commitment to take joint and separate action to
achieve the full realization of the right[s protected in the
Covenant].”446 As a component of implementing this commitment,
State parties should take steps to respect the enjoyment of these
protected rights in other countries, to protect those rights, to facilitate
access to food, and to provide the necessary aid when required. The
Committee emphasizes that “it is particularly incumbent on States
parties and other actors in a position to assist, to provide ‘international
assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical’ which
enable developing countries to fulfill their core and other
obligations.”447
States also have a joint and individual responsibility, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to cooperate in
providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of
emergency, including assistance to refugees and internally displaced
persons.448 Priority in the provision of international medical aid,
distribution and management of resources, such as safe and potable
water, food, and medical supplies, and financial aid should be given
to the most vulnerable or marginalized groups of the population.”449
In contrast, Thailand has not articulated any national strategy to
secure these rights for the refugees living within its border, nor, as is
required by the Covenant, has Thailand attempted to provide an
environment that facilitates implementation of services by other State
446. Id. ¶ 36 (“In the spirit of Article 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, the
specific provisions contained in articles 11, 2.1, and 23 of the Covenant and the Rome
Declaration of the World Food Summit.”); see also Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts.,
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368,
¶ 53 (citing Article II, Alma-Ata Declaration, Report of the International Conference on
Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, 6-12 September 1978, in: World Health Organization,
“Health for All” Series, No. 1, WHO, Geneva, 1978); Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural
Rts., The Right to Education, Gen. Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶¶ 43-45 (“[T]he right to
education 28 Articles 2 (1) and 23 of the Covenant, Article 56 of the Charter of the United
Nations, Article 10 of the World Declaration on Education for All, and Part I, paragraph 34 of
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action all reinforce the obligation of States parties
in relation to the provision of international assistance and cooperation for the full realization of
the right to education.”).
447. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 45.
448. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food,
Gen. Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 38.
449. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 40.
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parties or by civil society actors.450 Although Thailand is ultimately
accountable for the protection of ICESCR rights within its
jurisdiction, it is important to note here to recognize that the burden of
humanitarian assistance should lie not just with Thailand, but with all
other ICESCR State parties as well. For Thailand to meet its
obligations under international law regarding the provision of food,
shelter, health care, and education for refugees, other State parties
have an obligation and responsibility to provide support, funding,
resources, and services.451 However, it also incumbent upon Thailand
to solicit support from donor States and civil society to ensure
protection of basic rights if Thailand is unable to do so using its own
available resources. Ultimately, as a State party, the obligation of
protecting ICESCR rights within the jurisdiction attaches, not to
donor States, but to Thailand itself.
3. Application of Rights to Adequate Standard of Living (Food &
Shelter), Health Care, & Education to Non-Nationals
ICESCR Article 2(1) states that all State parties must take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, by
all appropriate means and to the maximum of its available resources,
to progressively realize the rights in the Covenant.452 The second
paragraph of Article 2 then stipulates that States parties must
guarantee those rights will be exercised without discrimination of any
kind as to a number of enumerated categories including race,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
or other status.453 However, the third paragraph of Article 3 does
allow for one small carve out: “Developing countries, with due regard
to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what
extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the
present Covenant to non-nationals.”454
Article 2, paragraph 3, only applies to the economic rights in the
Covenant, and not to social and cultural rights. While there is some
450. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food,
Gen. Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 20.
451. See, e.g., id.
452. ICESCR, supra note 335, art. 2, ¶1.
453. Id. at art. 2, ¶2.
454. Id. at art. 2, ¶3.
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question as to what actually differentiates a given right in the
Covenant as exclusively economic, social, or cultural, it appears from
the travaux préparatoires at the time of drafting paragraph 3, that
economic rights refers to specifically employment-related rights.455 In
fact, according to some scholars, the scope is even more limited,
given the actual origins and meaning of Article 2, paragraph 3.
According to the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the
ICESCR,456 “[a]s a general rule the Covenant applies equally to
nationals and non-nationals,” and the original purpose of article 2(3)
was actually only “to end the domination of certain economic groups
of non-nationals during colonial times.”457
Another set of independent scholars, expounding on this, state:
Paragraph 3 was not included in the original text of Article 2
which was proposed by the Commission on Human Rights.
Amendments to introduce the provision were first suggested by
Indonesia and Burma. The purpose of doing so, according to the
travaux préparatoires, was to allow former colonies which had
recently gained independence, and whose economies were
consequently dominated by the influence of non-nationals, to
protect the position of their nationals. The intentions of those
proposing the introduction of Article 2(3) is clear from their
response to concerns that the provision would ‘give rise to all
kinds of discrimination alien to the intentions of the sponsors’….
455. See Ben Saul, David Kinley, & Jacqueline Mowbray, THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES, AND
MATERIALS, pp. 214-215, (May 2014) (citing UNGA, Third Committee, A/5365 (17
December 1962), 21 & UNGA, Third Committee, A/5365 (17 December 1962), 20–21 (“The
distinction between economic, social and cultural rights is not entirely clear. As the Committee
has noted in relation to the right to education, for example: The right to education…has been
variously classified as an economic right, a social right and a cultural right [citing CESCR,
General Comment No. 11, Plans of action for primary education (Art. 14), E/C.12/1994/4 (10
May 1999)]. It is clear from the travaux préparatoires, however, that Article 2(3) was primarily
intended to cover rights to participate in economic activity. This would include, in particular,
rights to work under Articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant….”).
456. A group of experts in international law, convened by the International Commission
of Jurists, the Faculty of Law of the University of Limburg, and the Urban Morgan Institute for
Human Rights met in Maastricht in 1986 to consider the nature and scope of the obligations of
States parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The
participants unanimously agreed on what have become known as the Limburg Principles, a
reflection of the present state of international law. At a meeting on the tenth anniversary of the
Limburg Principles, a similar group of experts agreed on the Maastricht Guidelines on
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
457. The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶¶42-44, UN doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex; and Human
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1987), pp. 122–135.
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Far from opening the door to discrimination, the amendments
were designed to restore the proper balance by enabling nationals
to exercise their rights. In the developed countries which had not
been subjected to colonial domination, on the other hand,
immigration had always been controlled by the Government and
non-nationals did not, as a rule, offer serious competition to the
economic activities of nationals.458

A strong argument can be made, given this origin, that the exception
in article 2(3) should be interpreted very narrowly.459
In its own interpretation of the intersection of these paragraphs
within ICESCR Article 2, the ICESCR Committee specifically stated
in its General Comment 20, “The ground of nationality should not bar
access to Covenant rights, e.g. all children within a State, including
those with an undocumented status, have a right to receive education
and access to adequate food and affordable health care. The Covenant
rights apply to everyone including non-nationals, such as refugees,
asylum-seekers, stateless persons, [and] migrant workers…,regardless
of legal status and documentation.”460 Within this statement, the
Committee includes two footnotes. The first footnote concedes that
the statement is “without prejudice to the application of art. 2, para. 3,
of the Covenant.”461 The second footnote points, for further
clarification, to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination’s General Recommendation 30 on
discrimination against non-citizens.462 In CERD, another treaty to
which Thailand is a State party, Article 5 protects against racial
discrimination related to a number of rights including housing, health
care, and education.463 CERD Article 1 stipulates that “the term
‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing,
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,

458. See BEN SAUL, DAVID KINLEY, & JACQUELINE MOWBRAY, supra note 455.
459. See, supra note 455.
460. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Non-discrimination in economic, social
and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights), ¶30 1, Gen. Comment 20, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009).
461. Id. at footnote 22.
462. Id. at footnote 23.
463. CERD, see supra note 336, at art. 5.
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social, cultural or any other field of public life.”464 The second
paragraph of CERD Article 2 then clarifies, “This Convention shall
not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made
by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and noncitizens.”465 However, the CERD Committee, in its General
Recommendation 30 to which the ICESCR Committee points, notes
that “although some of these rights, such as the right to participate in
elections, to vote and to stand for election, may be confined to
citizens, human rights are, in principle, to be enjoyed by all
persons.”466 The CERD Committee further clarifies that “States
parties are under an obligation to guarantee equality between citizens
and non-citizens in the enjoyment of these rights to the extent
recognized under international law.”467 The CERD Committee then
notes that State parties should “[r]remove obstacles that prevent the
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by non-citizens,
notably in the areas of education, housing, employment and
health.”468 Specifically, the Committee guides States to ensure that the
right to housing is enjoyed equally by citizens and non-citizens; that
non-citizens have access to an adequate standard of physical and
mental health; that public educational institutions are open to noncitizens and children of undocumented immigrants; and that housing,
health services, and schooling in general are not segregated.469 Similar
provisions also exist in CEDAW and CRC—also treaties to which
Thailand is a State party, protecting individuals from nationalitybased discrimination related to fundamental economic, social, and
cultural rights.470
The Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking
water and sanitation, in her report on Thailand, also found that, at a
minimum, the nationality status cannot be used as a pretext to deny
basic rights to refugees living in Thailand. In her report, she stated:
The marginalized people that the Special Rapporteur met during
her mission represent a significant number of people living in
Thailand. Every individual, regardless of national origin, race,
464. Id. at art. 1(1).
465. Id., at art. 1(2).
466. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General recommendation XXX
on discrimination against non-citizens, ¶3, Gen. Recommendation 30, (Oct. 1, 2002).
467. Id.
468. Id. at ¶¶29-30.
469. Id. at ¶¶30-32 & 36.
470. See CEDAW, supra note 337; See also CRC, supra note 338.
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language and status, is equally entitled to the human rights to
water and sanitation. The Committee on the Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights noted that: 'The ground of nationality should
not bar access to Covenant rights… The Covenant rights apply to
everyone including non-nationals, such as refugees, asylumseekers, stateless persons, migrant workers and victims of
international trafficking, regardless of legal status and
documentation.’ People’s status cannot be used as a pretext to
deny them access to water and sanitation.

In particular, as discussed in Sections III.a.2.A-D, especially
vulnerable populations such as refugees and those fleeing disasters
are due protections and must be assured access to the means and
resources necessary to secure their fundamental rights.
In sum, the carve out in ICESCR Article 2, paragraph 3, should
be treated as a very narrow construction. At most, it should be read to
affect exclusively employment related economic rights—and even
these limitations should be subject to further narrowing, an issue to be
discussed in greater detail in the Right to Work section below. Thus,
the rights to food, shelter, health care, and education would remain
outside the carve out of paragraph 3. Furthermore, in addition to the
protections provided under ICESCR, several other core human rights
treaties to which Thailand is a State party also protect these rights and
do not allow discrimination in these areas based on nationality.471
Various Committees have pointed out that vulnerable refugees are
due protections to ensure their rights are secured. Given these various
treaty obligations, Thailand is required to protect the rights to food,
shelter, health care, and education equally for non-nationals residing
in their jurisdiction.
b. Freedom of Movement
1. Characterization of Right to Freedom of Movement
Just as many socio-economic rights are protected through
ICESCR, other civil and political rights are protected through another
key convention to which Thailand is a State party: the International

471. Id.
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).472 Specifically,
freedom of movement is protected under ICCPR Article 12, which
mandates:
Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence. . . . [This right] shall not be subject to any
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are
necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public),
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and
are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant . . . .473

The ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment 27
addressing freedom of movement, notes that “[l]iberty of movement
is an indispensable condition for the free development of a person.”474
Freedom of movement guarantees that a person is able to move
throughout the jurisdiction. Allowing movement, but only within a
designated area, or allowing movement into other areas, but only with
government permission, does not meet the necessary threshold for the
protection of this right.475 This freedom pertains not just to temporary
movement, but also to the choice of one’s residence.476 For example,
without a reason for allowable derogation, forcibly restricting areas of
settlement would constitute a violation.477
472. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
473. Id., at art. 12.
474. Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, ¶1, Gen. Comment 27, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 2, 1999) (citing Hum. Rts. Instruments, ¶ 8, Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies,
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3, 15 August 1997, 20).
475. Id. ¶ 5 (“The right to move freely relates to the whole territory of a State, including
all parts of federal States. According to article 12, paragraph 1, persons are entitled to move
from one place to another, and to establish themselves in a place of their choice. The
enjoyment of this right must not be made dependent on any particular purpose or reason for the
person wanting to move or to stay in a place. Any restrictions must be in conformity with
paragraph 3.”).
476. ICCPR, supra note 472, art. 12
477. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note
474, ¶ 7 (citing Communication No. 138/1983, Mpandajila v. Zaire, ¶ 10; Communication No.
157/1983, Mpaka-Nsusu v. Zaire, ¶ 10; Communication Nos. 241 and 242/1987,
Birhashwirwa/Tshisekedi v. Zaire, ¶ 13) ("Subject to the provisions of article 12, paragraph 3,
the right to reside in a place of one's choice within the territory includes protection against all
forms of forced internal displacement. It also precludes preventing the entry or stay of persons
in a defined part of the territory. Lawful detention, however, affects more specifically the right
to personal liberty and is covered by article 9 of the Covenant. In some circumstances, articles
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As protected under Article 12 of the ICCPR, Thailand is
required to protect the right of everyone lawfully within its
jurisdiction to liberty of movement and freedom to choose one’s
residence.478 Any restriction by Thailand of this fundamental right
must be explicitly provided for in law and must be necessary to
protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or
morals or the rights and freedoms of others.479
Only allowing refugee movement within a designated area, or
allowing movement into other areas only with government
permission, does not meet the necessary threshold for the protection
of this right.480 This freedom also pertains not just to temporary
movement, but also to the choice of one’s residence.481 Forcibly
restricting areas of settlement also constitutes a violation.482 Thailand
is violating these refugees’ rights to freedom of movement by forcing
12 and 9 may come into play together."); id. ¶ 17 ("A major source of concern are the manifold
legal and bureaucratic barriers unnecessarily affecting the full enjoyment of the rights of the
individuals to move freely, to leave a country, including their own, and to take up residence.
Regarding the right to movement within a country, the Committee has criticized provisions
requiring individuals to apply for permission to change their residence or to seek the approval
of the local authorities of the place of destination, as well as delays in processing such written
applications.").
478. ICCPR, supra note 472, art. 12.
479. Id.
480. Id. ¶ 5 (“The right to move freely relates to the whole territory of a State, including
all parts of federal States. According to article 12, paragraph 1, persons are entitled to move
from one place to another, and to establish themselves in a place of their choice. The
enjoyment of this right must not be made dependent on any particular purpose or reason for the
person wanting to move or to stay in a place. Any restrictions must be in conformity with
paragraph 3.”).
481. ICCPR, supra note 472, art. 12
482. Citing, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra
note 474, ¶ 7 (Communication No. 138/1983, Mpandajila v. Zaire, ¶ 10; Communication No.
157/1983, Mpaka-Nsusu v. Zaire, ¶ 10; Communication Nos. 241 and 242/1987,
Birhashwirwa/Tshisekedi v. Zaire, ¶ 13) ("Subject to the provisions of article 12, paragraph 3,
the right to reside in a place of one's choice within the territory includes protection against all
forms of forced internal displacement. It also precludes preventing the entry or stay of persons
in a defined part of the territory. Lawful detention, however, affects more specifically the right
to personal liberty and is covered by article 9 of the Covenant. In some circumstances, articles
12 and 9 may come into play together."); id. ¶ 17 ("A major source of concern are the manifold
legal and bureaucratic barriers unnecessarily affecting the full enjoyment of the rights of the
individuals to move freely, to leave a country, including their own, and to take up residence.
Regarding the right to movement within a country, the Committee has criticized provisions
requiring individuals to apply for permission to change their residence or to seek the approval
of the local authorities of the place of destination, as well as delays in processing such written
applications.").
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them to reside within closed camps and not allowing free entry and
egress from camp boundaries.
2. ICCPR Framework Underpinning Right to Freedom of Movement
There are some limited allowable derogations from the
protection of freedom of movement.483 First, any derogation must be
detailed in writing in domestic law—and the law must also clearly
outline the conditions under which the right may be limited.484
Second, the right can only be derogated for one of the specific,
enumerated, and exhaustive reasons: national security; public order;
public health or morals; or to protect the rights and freedoms of
others.485
Finally, the permissible limitations that may be imposed on the
rights protected under Article 12 must be narrowly tailored—meaning
they “must not nullify the principle of liberty of movement, and are
governed by the requirement of necessity provided for in Article 12,
paragraph 3, and by the need for consistency with the other rights
recognized in the Covenant.”486 In other words, as the Committee
notes:
In adopting laws providing for restrictions permitted by article
12, paragraph 3, States should always be guided by the principle
that the restrictions must not impair the essence of the right (cf.
art 5, para. 1); the relation between right and restriction, between
norm and exception, must not be reversed. The laws authorizing
the application of restrictions should use precise criteria and may
not confer unfettered discretion on those charged with their
execution.

Article 12, paragraph 3, clearly indicates that it is not sufficient that
the restrictions serve the permissible purposes; they must also be
necessary to protect them. Restrictive measures must conform to the
principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their
protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument
amongst those which might achieve the desired result; and they must
be proportionate to the interest to be protected. The Committee states,
“[Finally, t]he principle of proportionality has to be respected not
483.
484.
485.
486.

Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶ 3.
Id. ¶¶ 3, 12.
ICCPR, supra note 472, art. 12
Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶ 2.
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only in the law that frames the restrictions, but also by the
administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law.”487 In
general, the application of any permissible restrictions must also be
consistent with the other rights guaranteed in the Covenant and with
the fundamental principles of equality and non-discrimination; thus, it
would be a clear violation of the Covenant if the rights enshrined
under Article 12 were restricted by making distinctions of any kind,
such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.488
Even when derogations could be justified under certain
circumstances, the Committee requires the parameters of these
derogations to be outlined in national reports to the Human Rights
Committee during the ICCPR periodic review process.489 The
Committee stipulates:
States parties should provide the Committee in their reports with
the relevant domestic legal rules and administrative and judicial
practices relating to the rights protected by this article, taking
into account the issues discussed in this General Comment. They
must also include information on remedies available if these
rights are restricted.490

In terms of limited allowable derogations, these are only
permissible in extremely limited circumstances.491 First, any
derogation must be detailed in writing in domestic law—and the law
must also clearly outline the conditions under which the right may be
limited.492 No legislation in Thailand exists that limits the residence
and movements of refugees or asylum seekers. Thai authorities have
claimed that a policy has always existed that limits the movement of
refugees in the nine camps; however, no such written policy is
available either to the public or to refugees.493
Second, the right can only be derogated for one of the specific,
enumerated, and exhaustive reasons: national security; public order;
public health or morals; or to protect the rights and freedoms of
487. Id. ¶¶ 13-15.
488. Id. ¶ 18.
489. Id. ¶ 3.
490. Id.
491. Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶ 3.
492. Id. ¶¶ 3, 12.
493. See supra, note 285.
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others.494 Thailand has offered no such rationale for restricting the
freedom of movement of refugees. While it is unclear how any of
these reasons could be applicable in this case, even if Thailand was to
try and offer one as justification for camp closures, the Committee
would also require that the limitation imposed on the right to freedom
of movement be necessary and narrowly tailored.495 The Committee
explains that any law authorizing the application of restrictions must
use precise criteria and may not confer unfettered discretion on those
charged with their execution.496 Restrictive measures must conform to
the principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve
their protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument
amongst those which might achieve the desired result; and they must
be proportionate to the interest to be protected.497 Thailand has no
written law, let alone a law that details any reasoning (necessary or
otherwise) for a restriction of movement; a process to evaluate and
limit which refugees should be included in the restriction; or a process
by which the effects of this restriction could be best curtailed. Finally,
it is clear that these restrictions as they stand are based solely on the
affected individuals’ national or social origin, race, or political or
other opinion—discriminatory restrictions all obvious violations of
Article 12.498
3. Application of Right to Freedom of Movement to Non-Nationals
Each State party must ensure the rights in the Covenant to “all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”499 In
general, the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to everyone,
irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her nationality or
statelessness.500 Subsequently, freedom of movement is a right
guaranteed by the Convention to both nationals and non-nationals
who are legally within the territory of the State. As the Committee
says, “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State enjoys, within
494. ICCPR, supra note 472, art. 12
495. Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶ 2.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Id. ¶ 18.
499. ICCPR, supra note 472, art. 2(1).
500. Hum. Rts. Comm., The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, ¶ 1, Gen. Comment
15, U.N. Doc. HRI/Gen/1/Rev.9 (April 11, 1986).
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that territory, the right to move freely and to choose his or her place
of residence.”501
The legality of a non-national’s presence is determined by the
State’s domestic law.502 While a State can subject entry of nonnationals to certain restrictions, these restrictions must be in
compliance with the State’s treaty and other obligations under
customary international law.503 Furthermore, even a non-national who
enters the State illegally, but whose status is then subsequently
regularized by the State, would be deemed under the ICCPR to be
lawfully within the jurisdiction.504 As the Committee notes:
Once a person is lawfully within a State, any restrictions on his
or her rights . . . , as well as any treatment different from that
accorded to nationals, have to be justified under the rules [i.e.,
allowable derogations] provided for by article 12, paragraph 3.505

The general rule is that all rights in the ICCPR must be guaranteed
without discrimination between citizens and aliens.506 This pertains to
both legislation and implementation and practice.507 While the ICCPR
does not recognize the right of someone who is a non-national to
move to or enter that State, and/or initial consent for entry in some
cases may be given subject to conditions relating, for example, to
employment, once that alien has entered the State, the ICCPR
501. Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶
4 (citing Communication No. 456/1991, Celepli vs. Sweden, ¶ 9.2; citing also General
Comment No. 15, ¶ 8, in HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 3, 15 August 1997, 20).
502. Id.
503. Id. at ¶4 & 11-18,
504. Id. at ¶4
505. Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶
4 (citing Communication No. 456/1991, Celepli vs. Sweden, ¶ 9.2; citing also General
Comment No. 15, ¶ 8, in HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 3, 15 August 1997, 20). In principle, citizens of a
State are always lawfully within the territory of that State. The question whether an alien is
“lawfully” within the territory of a State is a matter governed by domestic law, which may
subject the entry of an alien to the territory of a State to restrictions, provided they are in
compliance with the State’s international obligations. In that connection, the Committee has
held that an alien who entered the State illegally, but whose status has been regularized, must
be considered to be lawfully within the territory for the purposes of Article 12. Once a person
is lawfully within a State, any restrictions on his or her rights guaranteed by Article 12,
paragraphs 1 and 2, as well as any treatment different from that accorded to nationals, have to
be justified under the rules provided for by Article 12, paragraph 3. It is, therefore, important
that States parties indicate in their reports the circumstances in which they treat aliens
differently from their nationals in this regard, and how they justify this difference in treatment.
506. Hum. Rts. Comm., The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, Gen. Comment 15,
supra note 500, ¶ 2.
507. Id. ¶ 4.
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guarantees that they are entitled to all of the rights in the
convention.508 The Committee has noted, for example, that aliens
have an inherent right to life, protected by law, and may not be
arbitrarily deprived of life; they must not be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, nor may they
be held in slavery or servitude; they have the full right to liberty and
security of the person; if lawfully deprived of their liberty, they shall
be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
their person; they may not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with their privacy, family, home, or correspondence; they
have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and the
right to hold opinions and to express them; they receive the benefit of
the right of peaceful assembly and of freedom of association; they are
entitled to equal protection by the law; and, of course, they have the
right to liberty of movement and free choice of residence.509 There
can be no discrimination between aliens and citizens in the
application of these rights, and these rights may be qualified only by
such limitations as may be lawfully imposed under the Covenant.510
Freedom of movement is a right guaranteed by the Convention
to both nationals and non-nationals who are legally within the
territory of the State.511 As the Committee has stated, even a nonnational who enters the State illegally, but whose status is then
subsequently regularized by the State, would be deemed under the
ICCPR to be lawfully within the jurisdiction.512 Camp residents are
asylum seekers seeking refugee status—and thus are legally within
Thailand’s jurisdiction. Thailand cannot deny the legality of their
presence simply by discontinuing refugee status determination
processes.

508. Id. ¶¶ 5-6.
509. Id. ¶ 7.
510. Id.
511. Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶
4 (citing Communication No. 456/1991, Celepli vs. Sweden, ¶ 9.2; citing also General
Comment No. 15, ¶ 8, in HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 3, 15 August 1997, 20).
512. See id. at ¶ 4.
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c. Right to Work
1. Characterization of Right to Work
Like the rights to food, shelter, health care, and education, the
right to work is also protected through the ICESCR—specifically
under ICESCR Article 6, which mandates:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to
work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to
gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and
will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right . . . .513

As the ICESCR Committee states in General Comment 27:
The right to work is a fundamental right, recognized in several
international legal instruments. The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as laid down in
article 6, deals more comprehensively than any other instrument
with this right. The right to work is essential for realizing other
human rights and forms an inseparable and inherent part of
human dignity. Every individual has the right to be able to work,
allowing him/her to live in dignity. The right to work contributes
at the same time to the survival of the individual and to that of
his/her family, and insofar as work is freely chosen or accepted,
to his/her development and recognition within the community.514
513. ICESCR, supra note 335, art. 6.
514. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Work, ¶ 1, Gen. Comment
18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 2006) (citing also preamble to ILO Convention No. 168,
1988, “ . . . the importance of work and productive employment in any society not only
because of the resources which they create for the community, but also because of the income
which they bring to workers, the social role which they confer and the feeling of self-esteem
which workers derive from them”); see also id. ¶ 3 (“[A]t the universal level, the right to work
is contained in article 8, paragraph 3 (a), of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Civil Rights (ICCPR); in article 5, paragraph (e) (i), of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; in article 11, paragraph 1 (a), of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; in article 32 of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and in articles 11, 25, 26, 40, 52 and 54 of the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of Their Families. Several regional instruments recognize the right to work in its general
dimension, including the European Social Charter of 1961 and the Revised European Social
Charter of 1996 (Part II, art. 1), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (art. 15)
and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 6), and affirm the principle that respect for the right
to work imposes on States parties an obligation to take measures aimed at the realization of
full employment. Similarly, the right to work has been proclaimed by the United Nations
General Assembly in the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, in its resolution
2542 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969 (art. 6).”).
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The right to work, as guaranteed in the ICESCR, affirms the
obligation of State parties to assure individuals their right to freely
chosen or accepted work, including the right not to be deprived of
work unfairly.515 The Committee notes, “This definition underlines
the fact that respect for the individual and his dignity is expressed
through the freedom of the individual regarding the choice to work,
while emphasizing the importance of work for personal development
as well as for social and economic inclusion.”516 The right to work
includes the right of every human being to decide freely to accept or
choose work.517 This implies not only being forced to exercise or
engage in employment, but also the right of access to a system of
protection guaranteeing each worker access to employment.518 It also
implies the right not to be unfairly deprived of employment.519
Thailand is also required to protect refugees’ right to work under
Article 6 of the ICESCR. The right to work, as guaranteed in the
ICESCR, affirms the obligation of State parties to assure individuals
their right to freely chosen or accepted work, including the right not
to be deprived of work unfairly.520 The right to work includes the
right of every human being to decide freely to accept or choose
work.521 This implies not only being forced to exercise or engage in
employment, but also the right of access to a system of protection
guaranteeing each worker access to employment.522 It also implies the
right not to be unfairly deprived of employment.523 By prohibiting
refugees from leaving camp boundaries and not allowing them to
secure gainful employment, Thailand violates this right to work.

515. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Work, Gen. Comment 18,
supra note 514, ¶ 4.
516. Id.
517. Id. ¶ 6.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Work, Gen. Comment 18,
supra note 514, ¶ 4.
521. Id. ¶ 6.
522. Id.
523. Id.
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2. ICESCR Framework Underpinning Right to Work
The right to work is supported by the same ICESCR framework
described in Section II.a.2. Like all human rights, the right to work
imposes three types or levels of obligations on State parties: the
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill.524 The obligation to respect
the right to work requires States parties to refrain from interfering
directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of that right.525 In particular,
as the Committee states:
States parties are under the obligation to respect the right to work
by . . . refraining from denying or limiting equal access to decent
work for all persons, especially disadvantaged and marginalized
individuals and groups, including prisoners or detainees,
members of minorities and migrant workers . . . .526

Violations of this right can occur through acts of commission—the
direct action of States or other entities insufficiently regulated by
States—or by acts of omission—the failure of a State to take steps
required by the Covenant.527 The Committee has cited several
examples of these types of violations, including “the formal repeal or
suspension of legislation necessary for continued enjoyment of the
right to work; denial of access to work to particular individuals or
groups, whether such discrimination is based on legislation or
practice; and the adoption of legislation or policies which are
manifestly incompatible with international obligations in relation to
the right to work.”528
As with other ICESCR rights to food, shelter, health care, and
education discussed earlier, State parties have a core obligation to
ensure the satisfaction of minimum essential levels of each of the
rights covered by the Covenant.529 In the context of Article 6, this
“core obligation” encompasses the obligation to ensure nondiscrimination and equal protection of employment.530 States must
ensure the right of access to employment, especially for
disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups, permitting

524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.

Id. ¶ 22.
Id.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id.
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them to live a life of dignity.531 As the Committee notes, the exercise
of work in all its forms and at all levels requires the existence of
interdependent and essential elements, including accessibility—i.e.,
the labor market must be open to everyone under the jurisdiction of
State parties.532 As stated previously, the Covenant prohibits any
discrimination in access to and maintenance of employment on the
grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, physical or mental
disability, health status (including HIV/AIDS), sexual orientation, or
civil, political, social, or other status, which has the intention or effect
of impairing or nullifying exercise of the right to work on a basis of
equality.533 The Committee notes:
The principle of non-discrimination as set out in article 2.2 of the
Covenant and in article 7 of the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families should apply in relation to employment
opportunities for migrant workers and their families. In this
regard the Committee underlines the need for national plans of
action to be devised to respect and promote such principles by all
appropriate measures, legislative or otherwise.534

Per the terms of the Covenant, State parties must also ensure the
progressive realization of the exercise of the right to work.535 The
Committee points out that such retrogressive measures include
“denial of access to employment to particular individuals or groups,
whether such discrimination is based on legislation or practice,
abrogation or suspension of the legislation necessary for the exercise
of the right to work[,] or the adoption of laws or policies that are
manifestly incompatible with international legal obligations relating
to the right to work.”536 State parties must therefore adopt, as quickly
as possible, measures aiming at achieving full employment.537 While
the Covenant provides for progressive realization and acknowledges
the constraints due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes
531. Id.
532. Id. ¶ 12 (“Only some of these topics feature in articles 2.2 and 3 of the Covenant.
The others have been inferred from the practice of the Committee or from legislation or
judicial practice in a growing number of States parties.”).
533. Id.
534. Id. ¶ 18.
535. Id. ¶ 19.
536. Id. ¶ 34.
537. Id. ¶ 19.
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on State parties various obligations that are of immediate effect.538 As
the Committee describes:
States parties have immediate obligations in relation to the right
to work, such as the obligation to ‘guarantee’ that it will be
exercised ‘without discrimination of any kind’ (art. 2, para. 2)
and the obligation ‘to take steps’ (art. 2, para. 1) towards the full
realization of article 6. Such steps must be deliberate, concrete
and targeted towards the full realization of the right to work.539

Furthermore, as with all other rights protected in the Covenant,
retrogressive measures should not be taken in relation to the right to
work.540 If any deliberately retrogressive steps are taken, State parties
have the burden of proving that they have been introduced after
consideration of all alternatives and that they are duly justified by
reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant in
the context of the full use of the State parties’ maximum available
resources.541
Like other rights protected under ICESCR, the right to work
imposes three types or levels of obligations on Thailand: the
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill.542 These obligations require
Thailand to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the
enjoyment of the right to work.543 In particular, the Committee notes
that State parties may not deny or limit equal access to decent work
for all persons, especially disadvantaged and marginalized individuals
and groups—groups such as refugees.544 Denial of access to work to
particular individuals or groups, whether such discrimination is based
on legislation or practice, is clearly a violation of this right.545
As with other ICESCR rights to food, shelter, health care, and
education discussed earlier, Thailand has a core obligation to ensure
538. Id.
539. Id. ¶¶ 19-20 (“The fact that realization of the right to work is progressive and takes
place over a period of time should not be interpreted as depriving States parties’ obligations of
all meaningful content. It means that States parties have a specific and continuing obligation
“to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible” towards the full realization of article
6.”).
540. Id. ¶ 21.
541. Id.
542. Id. ¶ 22.
543. Id.
544. Id. ¶ 23.
545. Id.
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the satisfaction of minimum essential levels to the right to work.546 In
the context of Article 6, this “core obligation” encompasses the
obligation to ensure non-discrimination and equal protection of
employment.547 Per the terms of the Covenant, State parties must also
ensure the progressive realization of the exercise of the right to
work.548 The Committee points out that such retrogressive measures
include “denial of access to employment to particular individuals or
groups, whether such discrimination is based on legislation or
practice, abrogation or suspension of the legislation necessary for the
exercise of the right to work, or the adoption of laws or policies that
are manifestly incompatible with international legal obligations
relating to the right to work.”549 During some periods, Thailand has
allowed refugees to leave the camps and secure gainful employment.
Restricting this right now is a retrogressive measure tied to an
impermissible distinction based on national or social origin, race, or
political or other opinion.550 Even if this deliberately retrogressive
step was not based on an impermissible distinction, Thailand would
still have the burden of proving that these measure were introduced or
enforced only after consideration of all other alternatives, and that the
restrictions are duly justified by reference to the totality of the rights
provided for in the Covenant in the context of the full use of the
Thailand’s maximum available resources—none of which Thailand
has done.551
3. Application of Right to Work to Non-Nationals
The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Optional Protocol
directly and explicitly protects the rights of refugees to work.552
Refugee Convention Article 17, paragraph 1, mandates that State
546. Id. ¶ 31.
547. Id.
548. Id. ¶ 19.
549. Id. ¶ 34.
550. Id. ¶¶ 19-20 (“The fact that realization of the right to work is progressive and takes
place over a period of time should not be interpreted as depriving States parties’ obligations of
all meaningful content. It means that States parties have a specific and continuing obligation
“to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible” towards the full realization of article
6.”).
551. Id.
552. See Refugee Convention, supra note 332, at art. 17.
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parties “accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most
favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the
same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage earning
employment,” and Article 17, paragraph 2 clarifies that, “[i]n any
case, restrictive measures imposed on aliens or the employment of
aliens for the protection of the national labour market shall not be
applied to a refugee who…has completed three years’ residence in the
country.”553 Thailand is not a party to the Refugee Convention, and is
therefore not bound by its provisions, but this language is still
important because it is indicative of the international standard
regarding the right to work for refugees. Even though to date Thailand
has not joined the Refugee Convention, Thailand is still bound by the
other core human rights treaties to which it is a State party, several of
which address the right to work.554
As discussed previously in Section III.a.3, ICESCR Article 2(1)
states that all State parties must take steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, by all appropriate means
and to the maximum of its available resources, to progressively
realize the rights in the Covenant.555 The second paragraph of Article
2 then stipulates that States parties must guarantee those rights will be
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to a number of
enumerated categories including race, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, or other status.556 However, as
noted earlier, the third paragraph of Article 3 does allow for one small
carve out: “Developing countries, with due regard to human rights
and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would
guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to
non-nationals.”557
Again, from the travaux préparatoires at the time of drafting
paragraph 3, it does seem that economic rights refers to the right to
work, although according to some scholars, the scope might really
only apply to states that are former colonies, recently having gained
independence, and whose economies were consequently dominated
by the influence of non-nationals—i.e., a provision designed to enable
553. Id.
554. ICESCR, supra note 335, art. 6; CERD, see supra note 336, at art. 5; and CEDAW,
see supra note 337, at art. 11.
555. See supra, Section III.a.3.
556. ICESCR, supra note 335, at art. 2, ¶2.
557. Id. at art. 2, ¶3.
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nationals to exercise their rights in limited circumstances where a
national economy is dominated by non-nationals from the former
colonial power.558 According to this perspective, this provision was
never intended to apply generally to other developing countries that
had not been subjected to colonial rule; the carve out would not be
applicable in the context where immigration had always been
controlled “by the Government[,] and non-nationals did not, as a rule,
offer serious competition to the economic activities of nationals.”559
While the ICESCR Committee does not address this issue
directly, nor clarify specifically to which rights in the Covenant
Article 2, paragraph 3, applies, the Committee does refer to the
requirement that State parties ensure that vulnerable population such
as refugees are able to access resources and services to secure their
fundamental rights, and they do make reference in General Comment
20 to this carve out as it applies to refugees. The Committee notes that
in general the “Covenant rights apply to everyone including nonnationals, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, [and]
migrant workers…,regardless of legal status and documentation,” and
the Committee also comments that, specifically for some nonemployment related rights, “[t]he ground of nationality should not bar
access to Covenant rights,”560 Again, within this statement, the
Committee includes two footnotes. The first footnote concedes that
the statement is “without prejudice to the application of art. 2, para. 3,
of the Covenant.”561 The second footnote points, for further
clarification, to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination’s General Recommendation 30 on
discrimination against non-citizens.562 In CERD, Article 5 protects
against racial discrimination related to a number of rights including
the right to work.563 As discussed in Section III.a.3, the CERD
Committee, found that while Article 1, paragraph 2, stipulates that
“[CERD] shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or
preferences made by a State Party…between citizens and noncitizens,”564 and even though “some of these rights, such as the right
558. See BEN SAUL, DAVID KINLEY, & JACQUELINE MOWBRAY, supra note 455.
559. Id.
560. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Non-discrimination in economic,
social, and cultural rights, Gen. Comment 20. supra note 460.
561. Id. at n.22.
562. Id. at n.23.
563. CERD, see supra note 336, at art. 5.
564. Id., at art. 1(2).
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to participate in elections, to vote and to stand for election, may be
confined to citizens,” it is still true that “human rights are, in
principle, to be enjoyed by all persons.”565 The Committee further
clarifies that “States parties are under an obligation to guarantee
equality between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of these
rights to the extent recognized under international law.”566
Specifically regarding the right to work, the CERD Committee, while
recognizing that, while States parties may refuse to offer jobs to noncitizens without a work permit, those individuals are still entitled to
labor and employment rights, including the freedom of assembly and
association.567 The Committee then also mandates that State parties
“[t]ake measures to eliminate discrimination against non-citizens in
relation to working conditions and work requirements, including
employment rules and practices with discriminatory purposes or
effects.”568 The Committee also recognizes that “in some cases denial
of citizenship for long-term or permanent residents could result in
creating disadvantage for them in access to employment and social
benefits, in violation of the Convention’s anti-discrimination
principles.”569
In sum, the Refugee Convention standard would suggest that,
at a minimum, refugees living in Thailand for more than three years
should be entitled to work.570 Although Thailand, not having joined
the Refugee Convention, is not bound by this requirement, the other
human rights conventions to which Thailand is a State party would
create some obligations for Thailand regarding the right to work.571 In
general, the rights protected in these conventions to which Thailand is
a State party apply to everyone in Thailand, including refugees.572
Thailand is also under an obligation to guarantee equality between
citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of employment-related
rights to the extent recognized under international law.573 Regarding
565. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 466.
566. Id.
567. See id. at ¶ 35.
568. Id. at ¶ 33.
569. Id. at ¶ 15.
570. See Refugee Convention, supra note 332, at art. 17.
571. ICESCR, supra note 335, art. 6; CERD, see supra note 336, at art. 5; and CEDAW,
see supra note 337, at art. 11.
572. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., supra note 460.
573. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 466.
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the right to work specifically, some limitations not applicable to
citizens may be allowable in the short-term (e.g., initial work permits
administered on a non-discriminatory basis).574 However, some of
these refugees have been living in Thailand for many years—some for
even thirty years or mores.575 Thailand cannot continue to block paths
to citizenship, and/or refuse to continue refugee status determinations,
and then use non-citizenship or undetermined legal status as a
justification for continued violations of the right to work.576
d. Coerced Returns & Principle of Non-Refoulement
The principle of non-refoulement is most clearly articulated in
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention: “No Contracting State shall
expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.”577 While Thailand is not
a State party to the Refugee Convention, this same non-refoulement
language is echoed in several other treaties to which Thailand is a
signatory, including the ICCPR, Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”), and Convention on Enforced Disappearances (“CED”).578
Customary international law also binds states to the principle of nonrefoulement, demanding that, just as is stated in the Refugee
Convention, refugees not be returned to their country of origin if there
is a concern that their life or liberty would be at risk.579 During
Thailand’s 2011 UPR cycle, more than one State party addressed
Thailand’s duty to respect the customary international norm of nonrefoulement, in addition to the calls by several other State parties to
574. See id. at ¶ 35.
575. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014-2015 Global Appeal, supra note
10, at 1.
576. See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 466, at ¶ 15.
577. REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 332, at art. 33.
578. For example, both CAT Article 3 and CED Article 16 stipulate that a State Party is
not allowed to refouler a person “where there [is a] substantial ground for believing” that
he/she will be subjected to torture or enforced disappearance, respectively. The Human Rights
Committee has also explained that non-refoulement is entrenched in ICCPR Article 2, which
obligates States Parties to ensure all ICCPR rights for all persons within the country’s territory
or under its control, including “an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise
remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that
there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as [deprivation of life or liberty].” See Hum. Rts.
Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶ 12.
579. See Vignos, supra note 197.
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either recognize refugee rights in general, accede to the Refugee
Convention, or both.580
Thailand’s recent increased enforcement of restrictions on
movement and work in the camps, coupled with decreases in essential
resources and services, has placed refugees in a type of
stranglehold—forcing them to choose between unacceptable and
unsustainable living conditions in Thailand or to return back to
Myanmar, where their life or liberty may be threatened. Despite
Myanmar’s democratic transition, conditions in the country are
unstable and not yet conducive for returns. Fighting between the
Tatmadaw and armed ethnic groups continues in many states.581 In
Kayin State, from where the vast majority of Burmese refugees in
Thailand originate, the Tatmadaw has been building new—and
bolstering old—army bases and resupplying weapons, ammunition,
and rations since the 2012 ceasefire agreement.582 Among refugees,
these actions have led to a general distrust of the ceasefire.583
Instances of arbitrary arrest, torture, sexual violence, forced labor,
military conscriptions, and lack of access to legal due process have
also been reported since the ceasefire went into effect.584 Moreover,
development projects in Kayin, Kayah, and Mon States have led to
land grabs, displacement without adequate compensation, and an
increasing militarization throughout the region.585 There is a looming

580. Brazil and Canada made specific recommendations with respect to nonrefoulement. France, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Slovakia called on Thailand to address
refugee rights in general. In particular, Canada’s recommendation to “[b]ecome a party to the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol; ensure respect for
the principle of non-refoulement with respect to asylum seekers and refugees; avoid a
premature move to close camps on the Western border while conditions for voluntary, safe and
dignified return do not exist; and meet the protection needs of vulnerable peoples, such as the
Rohingya, in accordance with international law” needs to be revisited given the worsening
conditions in camps and the changes in the legal system within Thailand resulting in
constructive refoulement. Hum. Rts. Council, ¶¶ 89.15-16, 89.68-69, 89.70-71, Report of the
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Thailand, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/8 (Dec. 8,
2011).
581. More Clashes, More Talks, No Protection, BURMA PARTNERSHIP (Aug. 31, 2015),
http://www.burmapartnership.org/2015/08/more-clashes-more-talks-no-protection/.
582. TRUCE OR TRANSITION, supra note 170, at 106.
583. Id. at 106–17.
584. Id. at 32–46.
585. Id. at 89–90. See generally KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GRP., LOSING GROUND: LAND
CONFLICTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN EASTERN MYANMAR (2013); KHRG, ‘WITH ONLY
OUR VOICES, WHAT CAN WE DO?’: LAND CONFISCATION AND LOCAL RESPONSE IN
SOUTHEAST MYANMAR (2015); NINA SCHULER, KAYAH STATE SOCIOECONOMIC ANALYSIS

420

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:2

threat of conflict, which could be exacerbated by an influx of
returning refugees. Furthermore, landmines are scattered all over
Kayin and Kayah States, posing significant threats to individuals’
physical security.586
If refugees are coerced to return to Myanmar before conditions
are safe, Thailand may have violated the principle of nonrefoulement.587 Even if some refugees may be able to return safely to
Myamar, at least some other refugees would not be able to return
safely to a location where their life or liberty would not be
threatened.588 It is key to note that this status determination is an
individuated process, and Thailand cannot claim that some amount of
stabilization in Myanmar equates to a justification for wholesale
removal of refugee status for all Burmese refugees living in the
camps; in other words, Thailand must conduct an individual refugee
status determination for each refugee to determine whether or not
he/she could return without experiencing a threat to her/his life or
liberty.589
Furthermore, beyond direct refoulement, refugees are also
protected from indirect refoulement: States cannot coerce refugees to
return through a deprivation of basic needs.590 Although Thailand
may not be physically returning refugees across the border, their
failure to provide basic necessities, or the means to obtain them by
restricting freedom of movement and right to work, would amount to
indirect refoulement—which would be a violation under both
Thailand’s treaty obligations and under accepted norms of customary
international law.591
(Sept. 2013), available at https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/251013_Kayah%20
SEA%20Main%20Report%20FINAL%20.pdf.
586. See Ceasefire but No Demining in Myanmar’s Kayah State, supra note 193; Guy
Dinmore, Three Years, Zero Landmines Cleared, MYANMAR TIMES (July 14, 2015),
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/home-page/142-in-depth/15497-three-years-zerolandmines-cleared.html.
587. See,e.g., REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 332, at art. 33.
588. See Section II.A.4.
589. Id. See also REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 332, at art. 33.
590. Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER REFUGEES,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html. (last visited Nov. 14, 2016); see also Hum.
Rts. Council, ¶ 65, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/20/24 (Apr. 2, 2012) (stating that return programs must ensure that returns are
“fully voluntary and a result of a genuine, informed choice,” and that conditions are such that
the return is sustainable long-term).
591. See supra note 590; see also Vignos, supra note 197; Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom
of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶ 12. Thailand has signed, but not ratified,

2017]

CROWLEY REPORT

421

IV. CONCLUSION & KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
Several fundamental human rights of Burmese refugees living in
the nine border camps along the Thai-Burma border are being
violated by Thailand, including the rights to an adequate standard of
living (food and shelter), health care, and education; freedom of
movement; and the right to work. The combination of these rights
violations also threaten to constructively refoule these refugees in
violation of Thailand’s obligations under several core international
human rights treaties as well as principles of customary international
law.
Worsening conditions in Thai refugee camps are leading to
violations of the interlocking rights to food, shelter, health care, and
education, which are guaranteed by Articles 11, 12, and 13 of the
ICESCR. Thailand’s obligations extend to everyone in its jurisdiction,
and in particular, Thailand is required to ensure access to resources
and services needed to secure these rights for especially vulnerable
populations such as refugees. These obligations include providing
safe and nutritious food in appropriate amounts, and yet the current
ration amount refugees receive is far below international minimum
nutritional standards. Refugees also have a right to adequate shelter,
but Thailand not only does not supply materials for housing and
repairs, but also prohibits refugees from building housing from
durable and protective materials. Refugees have a right to health care,
but decreased resources and services in refugee camps have created
declining conditions in the quality and availability of skilled medical
personnel and equipment, and Thailand has made no effort to
implement alternative health facilities and services. Refugees are also
the International Convention for Enforced Disappearances (“CED”). As a signatory, Thailand
must not act contrary to the purpose and principles of the Convention. Because nonrefoulement is a principle expressed in the CED, Thailand is therefore prohibited from
violating the principle, despite the fact that it has not ratified the Convention. Additionally, in
its 2013 report on Thailand, CAT expressed concerns about the Thai government’s possible
refoulement of Burmese refugees and asylum seekers. The Committee reminded Thailand that
enabling or executing refoulement violates the country’s obligations under Article 3 of CAT,
and it urged Thailand to accede to the Refugee Convention and its Protocol. CAT also
recommended that Thailand work with UNHCR to amend the Thai Immigration Act and
reevaluate its national asylum and refugee determination systems to bring them in line with
international standards.
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experiencing violations of the right to education. Thailand does not
provide educational services within the camps; as funding decreases
for the NGOs that do provide services, Thailand must ensure that free
primary education is provided, and that refugees maintain access to
available and quality educational services.
There are several components of the ICESCR framework that
underpin these protections. Most importantly, these rights are
afforded to everyone without discrimination of any kind as to race,
color, sex, language, age, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status. They therefore protect
not just Thai citizens, but also refugees and asylum seekers living in
Thailand. Treaty provisions allowing developing countries to
determine to what extent they would guarantee economic rights to
non-nationals are inapplicable here because the rights to food, shelter,
health care, and education are not economic, i.e., employment-related
rights, in the meaning of ICESCR Article 2, paragraph 3. Thailand
has an obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill these rights
protections, and both its actions and inactions constitute violations of
these rights. Thailand has a core, non-derogable obligation to ensure
the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each
of the rights enunciated in the Covenant for everyone within its
jurisdiction, and Thailand cannot argue that resource constraints make
it impossible to provide access to food, shelter, health care, or
educational services for those who are unable by themselves to secure
such access without first demonstrating that every effort has been
made to use all the resources at Thailand’s disposal in an effort to
satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations. Nor are
retrogressive measures taken in relation to these rights permissible;
while Thailand never itself funded the supply of food, goods, and
services within these camps, with the decline in resource provision,
Thailand has deliberately begun to enforce policies that cement
refugees’ inability to secure appropriate resources to fulfill their
rights. With the enactment of these deliberately retrogressive
measures, Thailand has the burden of proving that they have been
introduced after the most careful consideration of all alternatives, and
that they are duly justified by reference to the totality of the rights
provided for in the Covenant in the context of the full use of
Thailand’s maximum available resources. While Thailand is not
expected to solely shoulder the responsibility for funding and
resourcing this refugee population, Thailand is ultimately accountable
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for the protection of ICESCR and other treaty rights within its
jurisdiction; therefore, Thailand is required to request and facilitate
cooperation of NGOs, civil society, businesses, and/or other State
party donors to ensure that Thailand meets its treaty obligations. In
turn, other State parties have an obligation and responsibility to
provide support, funding, resources, and services.
Under ICCPR Article 12, Thailand is also obligated to ensure the
freedom of movement for refugees within its territory. Thailand’s
strict confinement of refugees to camps contravenes the right to
freedom of movement. Thailand’s unwritten policy to not allow
refugees to leave camps is not recorded in law; neither is the policy
available in written documentation to refugees or to the public. Aside
from this, these blanket restrictions on movement are far too broad to
meet any of the tests—proportionality, necessity, or most narrow
tailoring—to be allowed as an acceptable derogation.
Thailand is also obligated to guarantee the right to work under
ICESCR Article 6, which recognizes the individual’s right to work
and gain his living wage by work that he/she freely chooses. The
scarcity of work within the camps means that any prohibition on
leaving the camps is effectively a prohibition on work. Asylum
seekers and refugees are not excluded from these protections; CESCR
has stated that the ground of nationality should not bar access to
rights, and that these rights apply to everyone including nonnationals, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, and
migrant workers regardless of legal status and documentation. The
Committee has also stated that State parties must ensure that
vulnerable populations such as refugees are able to secure their rights.
The Refugee Convention standard mandates that, at a minimum,
refugees living in the host country for more than three years should be
entitled to work. Although Thailand, not having joined the Refugee
Convention, is not bound by this requirement, the other human rights
conventions to which Thailand is a State party would create some
obligations for Thailand regarding the right to work. For example,
Thailand is under an obligation to guarantee equality between citizens
and non-citizens in the enjoyment of employment-related rights to the
extent recognized under international law. In light of ICESCR Article
2, paragraph 3, some limitations not applicable to citizens may be
allowable in the short-term for refugees (e.g., initial work permits
administered on a non-discriminatory basis). However, Thailand
cannot continue to block paths to citizenship, and/or refuse to
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continue refugee status determinations, and then use non-citizenship
or undetermined legal status as a justification for continued violations
of the right to work.
Not only is Thailand not meeting its minimum core requirements
under ICESCR in terms of the rights to food, housing, healthcare, and
education, but their policies restricting movement and work are
actually exacerbating worsening conditions in the camps by
eliminating potential income earning opportunities which could
otherwise be used to supplement declining resources. These
restrictions are especially egregious in light of the resulting further
violations of the rights to an adequate standard of living—including
food and housing, health care, and education. Thailand also has an
obligation under various treaties to which Thailand is a State party—
including the ICCPR, CAT, and CED, as well under customary
international law, to not return, or refoule, refugees to a location
where there is a concern that their life or liberty would be at risk.
Thailand’s recent increased enforcement of restrictions on movement
and work in the camps, coupled with decreases in essential resources
and services, has placed refugees in a type of stranglehold—forcing
them to choose between unacceptable and unsustainable living
conditions in Thailand or to return back to Myanmar, where their life
or liberty may be threatened. Despite Myanmar’s democratic
transition, conditions in the country are unstable and not yet
conducive for returns. A large influx of retuning refugees might also
exacerbate already unstable conditions, leading to even greater risk of
violence or unsafe conditions. Even if some refugees may be able to
return safely to Myanmar, at least some other refugees would not be
able to do so. Thailand must conduct an individual refugee status
determination for each refugee to determine whether or not he/she
could return without experiencing a threat to her/his life or liberty.
Refugees are also protected from indirect, or constructive,
refoulement. Thailand cannot coerce refugees to return through a
deprivation of basic needs. Although Thailand may not be physically
returning refugees across the border, their failure to provide basic
necessities, or the means to obtain them by restricting freedom of
movement and right to work, would amount to indirect refoulement—
which would be a violation under both Thailand’s treaty obligations
and under accepted norms of customary international law.
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KEY RECOMMENDATIONS


Accede without delay to the 1951 Refugee Convention
and its 1967 Optional Protocol.



Amend the Thai Immigration Act to establish a national
asylum mechanism in line with international standards.



With the support of the international community,
establish a mechanism and funding for the provision of
resources and services to ensure refugees’ rights to food,
shelter, health care, and education.



In keeping with Thailand’s international obligation to
afford freedom of movement to all people lawfully
within its borders, eliminate restrictions that prohibit
Burmese refugees from transiting camp boundaries.



In keeping with Thailand’s international obligation to
afford all people within its borders the opportunity to
work, eliminate employment restrictions that prohibit
Burmese refugees from gaining access to meaningful
employment in Thailand.



To ensure refugee access to durable solutions, permit
UNHCR entry to refugee camps to conduct
individualized refugee status determinations and
facilitate third country resettlement as appropriate.



Consult with refugee communities to address concerns
of forcible repatriation while ensuring that all returns are
voluntary and not coerced.



In accordance with treaty obligations and customary
international law, ensure that all policies, laws, and
government actions do not directly or indirectly violate
the principle of non-refoulement.
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